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THE DARK SIDE OF SELF-REGULATION
Benjamin P. Edwards*
The financial services industry indirectly regulates itself through little-
discussed, scandal-prone, and structurally-entrenched self-regulatory
organizations. FINRA, the most prominent of these self-regulatory
organizations, makes regulations and sets enforcement policy that
directly affect public welfare. As with other self-regulatory
organizations, FINRA's structure poses a continual risk that industry
members will subvert its processes to act like a cartel, promoting industry
interests at the expense of the public and contributing to the excessive
rents collected by financial intermediaries. Although this dark side to
self-regulation poses a constant danger, structural reforms may increase
the likelihood that FINRA and other self-regulatory organizations will
take the public's interests into account. While others have discussed how
self-regulatory organizations increasingly resemble afifth branch of the
federal government, this article shifts the focus to how the public actually
exercises its voice within FINRA and other self-regulatory organizations.
This Article examines the purportedly public representatives serving
on FINRA's Board of Governors. It finds that these public
representatives often simultaneously serve on the boards of corporate
financial intermediaries, giving rise to conflicts of interest between
loyalties to market participants and industry lobbying groups and their
roles as protectors of the public interest. To amplify the public's voice
within these organizations, this Article proposes a different appointment
process for the public representatives serving within self-regulatory
organizations and calls for increased transparency and improved
oversight.
*Associate Professor of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas William S. Boyd School of Law;
J.D., Columbia Law School. For helpful comments and conversations, special thanks to Nicole G.
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the Junior Scholars Virtual Colloquium hosted by the University of Toledo College of Law. Special
thanks to Dean Leticia Diaz and Barry University Dwayne 0. Andreas School of Law for scholarship and
grant support for this piece. For research assistance, thanks to Katherine Krepfle, Alison Martin, and
Mauricio Jimenez.
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I. INTRODUCTION
"Just why the INational Association of Securities Dealers (NASD)]
had created a playing field that so clearly fucked over the customer was
something I'd thought about often, and I'd come to the conclusion that it
was because the NASD was a self-regulatory agency, "owned" by the
very brokerage firms themselves. (In fact, Stratton Oakmont was a
member too.) "
- Jordan Belfort, The Wolfof Wall Street'
Governance structures influence institutional behavior. Organizational
priorities and focus often depend on how an organization selects its
leadership. This remains true for business entities, governmental
organizations, and the odd creatures that lurk in between.
The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), formerly
known as the National Association of Security Dealers (NASD), is a
quasi-governmental organization in the liminal space between business
and government. 2 It serves as primary regulator for Wall Street's broker-
1. JORDAN BELFORT, THE WOLF OF WALL STREET 99 (2013).
2. FINRA describes itself as "an independent, not-for-profit organization authorized by Congress
to protect America's investors by making sure the securities industry operates fairly and honestly." About
574 [VOL. 85
THE DARK SIDE OF SELF-REGULATION
dealer firms, and its rules and regulations contour much of the investor
protection landscape. Broker-dealer firms elect representatives to
FINRA's Board of Governors, allowing the industry to regulate itself with
limited public oversight. To protect the public and counterbalance
industry influence, FINRA's bylaws also call for a majority of its Board
of Governors be "public" members. 3  In theory, including public
representatives on FINRA's governing board should ensure that the
organization appropriately balances the public's interest against the
industry's legitimate operational concerns.
Public representatives play an important role. They influence the self-
regulator's zeal to protect investors. FINRA's bylaws call for Public
Governors to have no "material business relationship" to "a broker or
dealer or [other] self regulatory organization." 4 Although the bylaws do
not define the term "material business relationship," its practices show a
tolerance for public members with significant connections to the financial
services industry.5 Many of FINRA's public governors have had long
industry careers and serve on the boards of other financial services firms.6
While these backgrounds may increase the likelihood that public
representatives understand issues, this benefit comes with a dark side-
the risk that public representatives will naturally sympathize with industry
more than public concerns.
Illustrating this concern, one "public" governor also serves on the
board of an industry-funded organization that actively lobbies on behalf
of the industry. FINRA's annual report identifies Randal Quarles as a
current "public" governor.7 Mr. Quarles also serves on the Board of
FINRA, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/about (last visited July 6, 2016). Some controversy exists over
whether FINRA has become a de facto extension of the government. See Roberta S. Karmel, Should
Securities Industry Self-Regulatory Organizations Be Considered Government Agencies?, 14 STAN. J.L.
Bus. & FIN. 151 (2008) ("This article addresses the questions of whether, and to what extent, securities
industry [self-regulatory organizations] have become govemment agencies, and whether, and to what
extent, they should be subject to constitutional and statutory controls on government agencies")
[hereinafter Karmel, Government Agencies?]; William A. Birdthistle & M. Todd Henderson, Becoming
A Fifth Branch, 99 CORNELL L. REv. 1 (2013) (arguing that FINRA may become a quasi-governmental
organization).
3. FINRA, BY-LAWS OF THE CORPORATION ART. VII, § 4 ("The number of Public Governors
shall exceed the number of Industry Governors.").
4. FINRA, BY-LAWS OF THE CORPORATION ART. 1, § tt.
5. See Susan Antilla, Finance Execs Fill 'Public' Board Seats at Finra, the Regulator That
Promises Investor Protection, STREET FOUND. (Aug. 26, 2016),
http://www.thestreetfoundation.org/story/finance-execs-fill-public-board-seats-finra-regulator-promises-
investor-protection (discussing industry connections of "public" representatives).
6. For a discussion of the industry ties of public representatives, see text accompanying notes 77-
110.
7. FINRA, FINRA 2015 YEAR IN REVIEW AND ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT 65 (July 30, 2016),
https://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/2015_YR_AFR.pdf [hereinafter FINRA, 2015 ANNUAL
REPORT].
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Directors of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce (U.S. Chamber).8 The U.S.
Chamber describes itself as the "world's largest business organization
representing the interests of more than 3 million businesses." 9 FINRA-
regulated firms have contributed substantial sums to the U.S. Chamber.' 0
Serving these interests, the U.S. Chamber has filed a lawsuit attempting
to block a proposed rule that would require many financial advisers to
give advice in the best interests of their clients."
The composition of FINRA's Board of Governors matters because it
makes significant policy decisions that shape the industry and influence
the public costs associated with financial services. These same public
costs are revenues to FINRA's member firms, however, so the FINRA
may not rush to support changes that would reduce overall costs. In any
event, the costs of financial intermediation have remained puzzlingly
high. One recent study by Thomas Philippon found that "the unit cost of
intermediation is about as high today as it was at the turn of the 20th
century."' 2  This is particularly puzzling because improvements in
information technology "should lower the physical transaction costs of
buying, pooling and holding financial assets."' 3
These issues diminish public confidence in FINRA's independence by
making it possible for detractors to reasonably characterize its majority
public board as "captured" by industry. Ultimately, FINRA's legitimacy
and efficacy depend on its ability to protect the public's interest while
drawing on industry expertise and balancing industry concerns.1 4 The
industry's control over its own regulation cannot be justified if the
industry uses that power to create a cartel supporting wealth transfers
from investors to industry firms.'"
8. See Board of Directors, U.S. CHAMBER COMMERCE, https://www.uschamber.com/about-
us/board-directors (last visited July 6, 2016).
9. About the U.S. Chamber, U.S. CHAMBER COMMERCE, https://www.uschamber.com/about-
us/about-the-us-chamber (last visited July 6, 2016).
10. For example, in 2014, Prudential Financial contributed $185,000 to the U.S. Chamber with
$75,000 earmarked for lobbying. 2014 Political Activities and Contributions Report, PRUDENTIAL 21
(Apr. 2015), http://www.prudential.com/media/managed/public/PACAnnualReport_14-Final.pdf.
11. See text accompanying note 107.
12. Thomas Philippon, Has the U.S. Finance Industry Become Less Efficient? On the Theory and
Measurement ofFinanciallnternediation, 105 AM. ECON. REv. 1408, 1413 (2015) [hereinafter Philippon,
Less Efficient].
13. Id. at 1434 ("A potential explanation is oligopolistic competition but the link between market
power and the unit cost of intermediation is not easy to establish.").
14. See Sam Scott Miller, Self-Regulation of the Securities Markets: A Critical Examination, 42
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 853, 855 (1985) (explaining that through self-regulation the "regulators and the
regulated seek different objectives" with regulators seeking efficient oversight and industry seeking
cheaper regulation) [hereinafter Miller, Self-Regulation].
15. See Birdthistle & Henderson, supra note 2, at 12 ("Self-regulation is easily justified if it
protects investors and maximizes social welfare but may not be if it is used merely to transfer wealth from
investors to brokers. This 'cartelization' problem is present in almost every area of broker-dealer
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To amplify the forces driving FINRA and other self-regulatory
organizations to act in the public's interest, this Article argues for
structural reforms to the regulatory architecture.' 6 These reforms seek to
address the problem from three different angles: the inside, the outside,
and above. To apply pressure from the inside, public processes should
pick the purportedly public members serving on FINRA's Board of
Governors. The current system allows industry representatives to
influence directly the selection of public representatives, increasing the
risk that these purportedly "public" representatives possess industry-
aligned views and sympathies.17 To ensure outside monitoring and
accountability, self-regulatory bodies wielding quasi-governmental
power should be required to provide transparent access to information.
This Article calls for expanding the Freedom of Information Act to allow
the public to review the SEC's oversight of FINRA's operations. Public
pressure might also constrain industry influence. Additional transparency
might also be achieved by requiring FINRA to meet some of the
disclosure requirements of publicly traded companies and to file public
annual reports with the SEC. Finally, this Article argues that enhanced
supervision from the SEC might unleash competitive forces and provide
more meaningful pressure from above.
These reforms should not be viewed as silver bullets. Rather they may
alter the competing forces driving FINRA's behavior and may cause it to
act differently in some instances. These reforms will not entirely displace
existing pressures for FINRA to act in ways that align poorly with the
public interest. Still, these reforms should shift the internal equilibrium
significantly, altering behavior in some instances. For example,
amplifying the public's voice should reduce the instances when FINRA
will act against the public interest and make its inevitable course
corrections come more quickly. Similarly, increased transparency and
access to information would let outside researchers and critics detect
issues more quickly. It would also provide a deterrent against exploitative
behavior by increasing the likelihood of discovery.
This Article tackles a substantial gap in the literature and addresses
how to "nudge" FINRA and other self-regulatory bodies into protecting
the public." While prior work has explored how the commission
regulation.").
16. A discussion of these reforms is available at the text accompanying notes 259 to 294.
17. This Article presents publicly available information demonstrating that a significant majority
of FINRA's current board would not be deemed "Public" under its own rules for distinguishing between
Public and Non-Public for arbitrators within its arbitration forum.
18. See Anita K. Krug, Downstream Securities Regulation, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1589, 1593 (2014)
(explaining that "[s]ecurities law scholars have tended to assume that securities regulation, in all its forms,
is ultimately reducible to the regulation of securities issuers, particularly the public kind" and generally
neglected the regulation of financial services and broker-dealer firms).
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compensation structure for financial advice causes the widespread
misallocation of capital, this Article examines the regulatory structures
that oversee the current system. 19 Despite the clear need for effective
supervision of the securities industry, the literature on "industry self-
regulation" remains underdeveloped. 20  This Article contributes to the
literature by focusing on FINRA's governance structure and reforms that
will create continual pressure to act in the public's interest and counteract
the industry's incentive to tilt regulation toward higher-fee
arrangements.21
This Article proceeds in five (II-VI) parts. Part II introduces FINRA's
unique history, role, and responsibilities. Part III discusses the public's
interest in financial regulation before Part IV critically examines
traditional rationales for self-regulation. Part V suggests governance and
policy reforms to increase FINRA's independence from industry. Part VI
discusses the implications of and challenges to this approach.
While this Article focuses on FINRA, its insights also have broader
applicability. The principles developed here can be applied to other self-
regulatory organizations to help create a more effective balance against
the possible dark sides of self-regulation.
II. FINRA's HISTORY, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND GOVERNANCE
While most now recognize administrative agencies as a fourth branch
of government, FINRA and other financial self-regulatory organizations
serve as a fifth branch and now play a vital role in financial regulation. 2 2
This Part opens by presenting a case study of FINRA's history, quasi-
governmental status, role in investor protection, and governance.
A. FINRA's Unique History
Wall Street's self-regulation first emerged from the creation of a cartel
19. Benjamin P. Edwards, Conflicts & Capital Allocation, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 181 (2017).
20. See Jonathan Macey & Caroline Novogrod, Enforcing Self-Regulatory Organization's
Penalties and the Nature ofSelf-Regulation, 40 HOFSTRA L. REV. 963 (2012) ("Few issues are as poorly
understood and under-theorized as the concept of 'industry self-regulation."'); Andrew F. Tuch, The Self-
Regulation of Investment Bankers, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 101, 105 (2014) (explaining that FINRA's
"self-regulation of investment bankers has thus far attracted scant scholarly attention"); Saule T. Omarova,
Wall Street as Community of Fate: Toward Financial Industry Self-Regulation, 159 U. PA. L. REv. 411,
414-15 (2011) ("[W]hat is conspicuously absent from the . . . broader debate among academics and
policy-makers, is a meaningful discussion of the role and shape of industry self-regulation in the emerging
postcrisis regulatory order. . . .").
21. Kathryn Judge, Intermediary Influence, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 573, 577 (2015) ("Because fees are
revenue to the intermediaries to whom they are paid, intermediaries prefer laws, norms, market structures,
and other institutional arrangements that entail higher, not lower, transaction fees.").
22. See Birdthistle & Henderson, supra note 2.
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attempting to control securities trading.23 Cartelization occurs when firms
join together to fix prices, restrict competition, or otherwise promote their
interests through collective action. When cartels engage in self-
regulation, they control member behavior to advance the collective
interests of the cartel, rather than the interests of the public.24
1. FINRA's Precursor: The New York Stock Exchange
FINRA traces its history back to 1792 when New York traders and
brokers gathered underneath a buttonwood tree and negotiated an
agreement to fix prices and trade with each other. Those present made a
solemn vow not to "buy or sell ... for any person. . . any kind of public
stock at a rate less than one-quarter percent commission." 25
The group of price-fixing traders that signed the famous "Buttonwood
Agreement" later became the New York Stock Exchange Board (NYSE)
in 1817.26 Members of this cartel enjoyed fixed commission rates for
executing securities trades and access to superior information.27 To
overcome the incentive to cheat the cartel by cutting prices and gaining
market share, the NYSE began to pass rules to control member behavior.
For example, a month after its founding, the NYSE instituted fines for
members that left the room during auctions.28
As growth continued, the NYSE became increasingly formal and
23. See JOHN C. COFFEE ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 690 (13th ed.
2015) (explaining that self-regulation's private enforcement originated out of "efforts at cartelization by
brokers"). See also William F. Baxter, NYSE Fixed Commission Rates: A Private Cartel Goes Public, 22
STAN. L. REv. 675, 712 (1970) for a discussion of other forms of self-regulation. See also Saule T.
Omarova, Rethinking the Future ofSelf-Regulation in the Financial Industry, 35 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 665,
674 (2010) ("[B]ecause the concept of self-regulation is both deceptively simple and heavily normatively
loaded, it is worth examining its meaning and boundaries in some detail.").
24. Cartels often struggle to control members that seek to profit by secretly breaking cartel rules.
To more effectively enforce cartel discipline, some cartels seek government authorization to discipline
their members. See Timothy J. Muris, Principles for a Successful Competition Agency, 72 U. CHI. L. REV.
165, 170 (2005) ("While cheating often undermines private cartels, those who cheat on public cartels,
once identified, can be sanctioned through the government.").
25. The Institution ofExperience: Self-Regulatory Organizations in the Securities Industry, 1792-
2010: Rules of the Club, Protecting the Members and the Market, SEC. & EXCH. COMM. HISTORICAL
SOC'Y, http://www.sechistorical.org/museum/galleries/sro/sro02b.php (last visited July 6, 2016)
[hereinafter SEC History, Protecting Members]. The members also promised to give preferences to cartel
members over nonmembers in negotiations. Id.
26. Jill Gross, The Historical Basis ofSecurities Arbitration as an Investor Protection Mechanism,
2016 J. DISP. RESOL. 171, 174 (2016) (citing FRANCIS L. EAMES, THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE 13
(1894)).
27. See SEC History, Protecting Members, supra note 25 ("Members enjoyed the advantages of
participating in an industry cartel that continued to regulate commission rates.").
28. Id. A member that left the room would know the price and could execute trades outside at the
NYSE market price.
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introduced its own internal legal system to regulate member behavior. 2 9
From the start, this legal system focused on enforcing cartel discipline by
cracking down harshly on members that violated the minimum
commission rules.30 Enforcement actions for swindling customers were
rare.31
The trend continued into the early 20th century with revelations that
the NYSE took no action despite knowing that its members routinely
manipulated securities by trading through stock pools. Stock pools
manipulate prices by trading with each other to give the impression of
genuine market demand, which drives prices higher. When investors
bought into the pool, anticipating further appreciation, pool members
would dump the stock. This left investors with losses after the artificially
created demand evaporated.3 2 Traders employing stock pools sat on the
NYSE's governing committee, and the NYSE's failure to act has been
attributed to their presence.3 3 Despite this, the NYSE publicly advertised
itself as acting in "the public interest," claiming that members
participating "in market raids may be disciplined." 34
Industry self-regulation, in other words, failed to adequately protect the
public from unrestrained manipulation and deception in the stock market.
This unrestrained manipulation and deception proliferated before the
1929 crash and contributed to the Great Depression. 35  In his inaugural
address, President Franklin D. Roosevelt told the crowd that "the rulers
of the exchange of mankind's goods have failed" and promised to deliver
29. See Belton v. Hatch, 17 N.E. 225 (N.Y. 1888) (finding that the NYSE could validly discipline
its members by expelling them from the organization).
30. The Institution ofExperience: Self-Regulatory Organizations in the Securities Industry, 1792-
2010: Rules of the Club, Coherence of the Self-Regulatory Regime, SEC. & EXCH. COMM. HISTORICAL
Soc'Y, http://www.sechistorical.org/museum/galleries/sro/sro02c.php (last visited July 6, 2016) ("From
the first, however, this member-controlled regime inevitably favored the floor over the investors that it
served, particularly in enforcement.").
3 1. Id.
32. See MICHAEL PERINO, THE HELLHOUND OF WALL STREET: How FERDINAND PECORA'S
INVESTIGATION OF THE GREAT CRASH FOREVER CHANGED AMERICAN FINANCE 267-68 (2010)
(explaining how stock pools manipulated market prices).
33. See The Institution of Experience: Self-Regulatory Organizations in the Securities Industry,
1792-2010: Rules of the Club, Public Relations and Partial Reforms, SEC. & EXCH. COMM. HISTORICAL
SOC'Y, http://www.sechistorical.org/museum/galleries/sro/sro02e.php (last visited July 6, 2016) ("[T]he
real power at the NYSE-the governing committee-was dominated by the floor traders and specialists
who considered pools to be prerequisites of the trade.").
34. H.S. MARTIN, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE 9-10 (Dec. 3, 1925).
35. Debate continues about the precise cause of the Great Depression, but manipulative market
practices certainly contributed. See Steven A. Ramirez, The Law and Macroeconomics of the New Deal
at 70, 62 MD. L. REv. 515, 526-27 (2003) ("The genesis of the Depression had its roots in the speculative
stock market boom of the 1920s."); Jorge Pesok, Insider Trading: No Longer Reserved for Insiders, 14
FLA. ST. U. BUS. REV. 109, 111 (2015) (explaining that Congress passed the federal securities laws "in
response to the manipulation and deception that plagued the stock market in the 1920s and eventually
caused the Great Depression.").
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comprehensive reform to restrain future manipulation and deception. 3 6
2. Increased Oversight: Breaking Out the SEC's Shotgun
Wall Street's self-regulatory organizations fought to keep their
independence and predicted financial ruin if proposed reforms were
implemented.3 7 Richard Whitney, then-president of the NYSE, predicted
that federal oversight of the NYSE and other stock exchanges would
"'destroy the free and open market for securities' and turn Wall Street
into 'a deserted village."'38 The head of the Association of Stock
Exchanges claimed that proposed legislation would cure "a case of
hiccups by 'severing the head of the patient."' 3 9
Despite intense opposition from the NYSE and Wall Street generally,
federal legislation came with the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act)4 0
and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act).4 ' With the
Exchange Act, Congress created the SEC and charged it with overseeing
the NYSE and other self-regulating securities exchanges.4 2
Former SEC Chairman and later Supreme Court Justice William 0.
Douglas joined the SEC as staff, shortly after its creation.4 3 During his
tenure at the SEC, he sought "first to make the management of the
[NYSE] less like that of a club and more like that of a public institution;
and second, to revise all the rules necessary to take away the insider's
advantage over the public." 44
Federal oversight of Wall Street through self-regulatory associations
relies on vigilant oversight. Douglas described the SEC's initial oversight
role as "letting the exchanges take the leadership with Government
36. PERINO, supra note 32, at 3.
37. Financial intermediaries have a long history of predicting disaster to forestall reforms. See,
e.g., Judge, supra note 21, at 597 ("By highlighting potential drawbacks ... the securities industry sought
to influence SEC decisionmaking ... faced with a choice between a system known to work ... and one
about which there were inevitable uncertainties, it would have been difficult-and irrational-for the SEC
to entirely ignore the industry's dire predictions.").
38. PERINO, supra note 32, at 293.
39. See id. at 292-93 (explaining that Wall Street and the NYSE argued that passing securities
laws would undermine economic recovery because issuers would fear liability so much that they would
forego offerings).
40. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa. (2012).
41. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78pp (2012).
42. See Silver v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 351-52 (1963) ("It was, therefore, the
combination of the enormous growth in the power and impact of exchanges in our economy, and their
inability and unwillingness to curb abuses which had increasingly grave implications because of this
growth, that moved Congress to enact the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.") (emphasis added).
43. WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, Go EAST, YOUNG MAN: THE EARLY YEARS: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY
OF WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS 258 (1974).
44. Id. at 291 (claiming that the self-regulating exchanges had become "modem Augean stables
... fighting for opportunities to exploit the unsuspecting public").
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playing a residual role. Government would keep the shotgun, so to speak,
behind the door, loaded, well oiled, cleaned, ready for use but with the
hope it would never have to be used."4 5
The NYSE slowly began to adapt under new SEC oversight. For
example, on the same day the NYSE Board voted to expel Richard
Whitney for embezzling money from a trust fund for widows and orphans,
it approved a committee recommendation to add three public members to
its thirty-person board.46 Thus, the inclusion of purportedly public
representatives on self-regulatory organization boards began. Shortly
thereafter, one of these first public members resigned when the NYSE
Board declined to expel members that had knowingly tolerated Whitney's
embezzlement. 7
In 1938, the shotgun-toting SEC assumed additional oversight
responsibilities with the passage of the Maloney Act of 1938.48 The
Maloney Act sought to aid the SEC's supervision of over-the-counter
markets by requiring broker-dealer firms to join together for cooperative
self-regulation through voluntary associations.4 9 The previously
unregulated over-the-counter market included broker-dealer firms trading
stocks outside of the limited oversight provided by the existing self-
regulating exchanges. By design, the Maloney Act contemplated the
creation of a self-regulatory association that would serve as both a
regulator and a professional organization for the over-the-counter
market.50 The SEC only authorized one self-regulatory organization, the
NASD, which merged with the regulatory arm of the NYSE in 2007 to
create FINRA.s1
45. WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE: THE ADDRESSES AND PUBLIC
STATEMENTS OF WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS AS MEMBER AND CHAIRMAN OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION 82 (James Allen ed., 1940).
46. Id. at 291; PERINO, supra note 32, at 296 ("Whitney lifted bonds and cash from the stock
exchange's Gratuity Fund, a trust for the widows and orphans of exchange members.").
47. DOUGLAS, supra note 43, at 291-92 (explaining that an SEC investigation "revealed the names
of various Exchange members who knew of Whitney's wrongdoing before the news broke. But nothing
was ever done by the Exchange to discipline or censure any of these members").
48. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (2012). For a description of the Maloney Act's framing, see The Institution
ofExperience: Self-Regulatory Organizations in the Securities Industry, 1792-2010: Born Regulated, Self
Help and the New Deal, SEC. & EXCH. COMM. HISTORICAL SOC'Y,
http://www.sechistorical.org/museum/galleries/sro/sro04b.php#ftn49 (last visited July 6, 2016)
("Whereas the Exchange Act had created a new self-regulatory model that enveloped the NYSE and the
regional exchanges into a scheme of federal securities regulation, the Maloney Act extended that model
to entities other than exchanges.").
49. Id.; see also DOUGLAS, supra note 43, at 271 (explaining that the Exchange Act "was amended
to allow, under general supervision of the commission, the self-government of brokers and dealers on the
over-the-counter market (which we facetiously called the under-the-counter market)").
50. See Karmel, supra note 2, at 160-61 ("From its inception, the NASD was a peculiar body,
designed to act as a regulator, but also functioning as a professional organization.").
51. Tuch, supra note 20, at 112; Donna M. Nagy, Playing Peekaboo with Constitutional Law: The
PCAOB and Its Public/Private Status, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 975, 1023 (2005) ("[T]he NASD owes
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B. FINRA's Unique Status and Role
At present, the federal regulatory scheme for the securities industry
depends heavily on industry regulating itself through self-regulatory
associations. 5 2 As the largest self-regulatory association and the only self-
regulatory association for broker-dealer firms, FINRA now oversees a
tremendous volume of activity. One recent annual report reveals that it
"processes and monitors on average 50 billion-and up to 75 billion-
pieces of market data every day." 53
1. Quasi-Governmental Status
FINRA straddles the line between a public and private entity.
Although FINRA officially remains a private, not-for-profit corporation,
it plays such an integral-and increasingly governmental-role in
securities regulation that debates have emerged over whether it should be
classified as a state actor.54 The literature and case law frequently
describe it as a quasi-governmental organization.
In many respects, FINRA often enjoys perquisites normally reserved
for state actors.56 For example, it enjoys absolute immunity for its
regulatory functions and even actions that are "incident to" its regulatory
functions, such as amending its bylaws. 7 It also enjoys a form of taxing
power, having the ability to raise money by imposing fees on member
firms.' 8 The Exchange Act authorizes FINRA to discipline its members
its origins to a trade group founded in 1912 by several investment banks, the Investment Bankers
Association of America . . . .").
52. See Barbara Black, Punishing Bad Brokers: Self-Regulation and FINRA Sanctions, 8 BROOK.
J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 23, 23 (2013) ("Regulation of the broker-dealer industry by a self-regulatory
organization (SRO) is an integral part of the federal regulatory scheme.").
53. FINRA, 2015 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 1.
54. See Birdthistle & Henderson, supra note 2, at 13 ("These particular SROs are becoming or, as
some have argued, have become quasi-governmental organizations (QGO).").
55. See, e.g., Jennifer M. Pacella, If the Shoe of the SEC Doesn't Fit: Self-Regulatory
Organizations and Absolute Immunity, 58 WAYNE L. REV. 201, 202 (2012) ("SROs carry out quasi-
governmental functions as delegates of the SEC."); Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc. v. S.E.C., 431 F.3d
803, 804 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (the NASD "serves as a quasi-governmental agency"). Roberta Karmel
characterizes self-regulatory associations as a "peculiar mix of private sector self-regulation and delegated
governmental regulation." Karmel, supra note 2, at 151.
56. See Kenneth B. Orenbach, A New Twist to an On-Going Debate About Securities Self-
Regulation: It's Time to End FINRA's Federal Income Tax Exemption, 31 VA. TAX REv. 135, 194 (2011)
("Although FINRA is not a government agency for constitutional purposes, it has many of the attributes
of a government agency and it functions as if it were such an agency.").
57. See Standard Inv. Chartered, Inc. v. Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, 637 F.3d 112, 114-15 (2d
Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 1173 (2012).
58. See, e.g., Dan Jamieson, FINRA Aims to Hike Fees Due to 'Significant Loss',
INVESTMENTNEWS (Apr. 24, 2012),
http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20120424/FREE/120429962/finra-aims-to-hike-fees-due-to-
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for violating its own rules, the Exchange Act or SEC rules. 5 9 Despite this,
the extent of its enforcement power remains limited, and it may only
discipline members by "expulsion, suspension, limitation of activities,
functions, and operations, fine, censure, being suspended or barred from
being associated with a member, or any other fitting sanction."6 0 It lacks
jurisdiction over nonmembers or the ability to impose criminal liability.
Importantly, while FINRA enjoys the protection of absolute, quasi-
sovereign immunity for its regulatory functions, its obligation to provide
due process protections remains unsettled.6 1
2. Investor Protection
FINRA's rules shape investor rights by setting out the duties that
broker-dealers owe to their customers. Some of these rules seem more
aspirational than substantive. For example, FINRA's rules require its
members to "observe high standards of commercial honor and just and
equitable principles of trade." 62  The substantive content of this
requirement remains unclear. Other FINRA rules specify the obligations
many financial advisers actually owe their clients, such as the much-
criticized "suitability" rule,6 3 which allows financial advisers to sell
clients "suitable" investments even if they are not necessarily in their
client's best interests.6 4
FINRA also polices the behavior of broker-dealer firms through
enforcement actions. It explains that one of its "top priorities is to
advance investor confidence in the securities markets through vigorous,
significant-loss (detailing a FINRA fee hike).
59. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-3(b)(7) (2012).
60. Id.
61. Compare D'Alessio v. S.E.C., 380 F.3d 112, 120 n.12 (2d Cir. 2004) ("[T]he National
Association of Securities Dealers ('NASD'), a private SRO . . . is not a state actor subject to due process
requirements."), with Rooms v. S.E.C., 444 F.3d 1208, 1214 (10th Cir. 2006) ("Due process requires that
an NASD rule give fair warning of prohibited conduct before a person may be disciplined for that
conduct."). For a detailed discussion of the due process decisions, see Jerrod M. Lukacs, Much Ado About
Nothing: How the Securities SRO State Actor Circuit Split Has Been Misinterpreted and What It Means
for Due Process at FINRA, 47 GA. L. REv. 923, 959 (2013) ("[W]hether FINRA is a private or public
actor remains tied up in a complicated split among the circuit courts.").
62. FINRA, FINRA MANUAL, R. 2010 (2008):
63. FINRA, FINRA MANuAL, R. 2011 (2014).
64. See Christine Lazaro, Fiduciary Duty - Now and in the Future, 17 PIABA B.J. 129, 132 (2010)
("[T]he suitability standard requires that a recommendation merely be suitable for a customer, not
necessarily that it be in the customer's best interest."); Patricia A. McCoy, Degrees ofIntermediation, 50
WAKE FOREST L. REv. 551, 571 (2015) ("Because the duty of suitability is not a fiduciary duty, securities
brokers are not required to act in their clients' best interests or diversify their portfolios .... Nor must
brokers avoid recommending investments that will maximize their fees if their advice is suitable
otherwise").
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fair and effective enforcement" of its own rules and the securities laws.65
Others have explained that financial self-regulatory organizations may be
able to enforce effectively so long as they are "maintaining a monopoly
and using their credible threat to be able to exclude a participating firm
from the cartel as its ultimate enforcement mechanism." 66
3. Dispute Resolution
FINRA also maintains control over industry regulation and the extent
of investor protection available by channeling customer disputes through
its arbitration forum.6 7 Unlike traditional court cases, arbitration awards
do not create binding precedent and generally do not set forth any
rationale for the decision. 6 8 Given the lack of explanation or precedent,
determining the actual level of investor protection provided by FINRA's
arbitration process may be impossible. 6 9
FINRA's arbitration process may undercut investor protection by
diminishing the ability of courts to refine existing obligations to account
for changed circumstances. With nearly all customer disputes flowing
through arbitration, courts resolve customer disputes only in rare
instances. This means that the law likely changes at a much slower pace
than the market evolves, rather than if courts were continually grappling
with new financial products and strategies.
C. Mixed Industry and Public Governance
FINRA's governance structure and the voices it empowers
undoubtedly influence its culture and behavior. FINRA's bylaws call for
a majority public board. It contains twenty-three members, with nine
industry representatives, thirteen purportedly public members, and
FINRA's CEO.70
A key premise underlies the decision to appoint to the board public
representatives, who must bring something different to the board than
65. Enforcement, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/industry/enforcement (last visited Aug. 16,2016).
66. Macey & Novogrod, supra note 20, at 966 (explaining that FINRA must maintain market
power to exercise effective discipline).
67. Most broker-dealers require customers to sign arbitration agreements that force customers to
resolve their disputes out of court. See Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226
(1987) ("The Arbitration Act ... mandates enforcement of agreements to arbitrate statutory claims.").
68. See Barbara Black & Jill I. Gross, Making It Up as They Go Along: The Role of Law in
Securities Arbitration, 23 CARDOZO L. REv. 991, 992 (2002) ("[A]wards do not serve as precedent-
future arbitration panels cannot rely on previous awards as a source of authority.").
69. Mercer Bullard, The Fiduciary Study: A Triumph ofSubstance over Form?;30 REV. BANKING
& FIN. L. 171, 179 (2010) (arguing that the standards actually applied in FINRA arbitration may be
unknowable).
70. FINRA, 2015 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 65.
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industry members-otherwise their appointment would serve no purpose.
Ideally, public representatives zealously guard the public's interest and
counterbalance industry influence within self-regulatory organizations.
To achieve this ideal, a public representative must have actual
independence and a true public-interest orientation. If, however, public
representatives share the same perspectives, beliefs, and biases as
industry members, they may represent the public's interest with less
vigor.7 ' At worst, industry-aligned public representatives provide only a
veneer of publicness, cloaking industry domination over a purportedly
independent board.
Despite the importance of good governance, the SEC has devoted little
attention to overseeing FINRA's governance processes. A 2012
Government Accountability Office Report found that the SEC had
"conducted limited or no oversight of. ... FINRA's ... governance and
executive compensation." 72 More specifically, between 2005 and 2010,
the SEC conducted no oversight of FINRA's transparency of
governance.73 With respect to FINRA's Board of Governors, the SEC
told the Government Accountability Office that it "periodically reviewed
the composition of FINRA's board to determine compliance with SRO
board-composition requirements." 7 4 The SEC indicated that it had not
"examined issues such as conflicts of interest or recusals related to
FINRA's governance."75
For these reasons, the SEC's oversight of FINRA's operations has been
fairly criticized. To be fair, the SEC's task may have been made more
challenging by repeated instances of FINRA officials providing "altered
or misleading documents" to the SEC.76 Still, its supervisory resources
could likely be targeted more effectively. The following case study of
FINRA's board shows that more extensive oversight of the "public"
member appointment process might do substantial good.
71. See Steven Davidoff Solomon, The Government's Elite and Regulatory Capture, N.Y. TIMES
(June 11, 2010), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/06/11/the-governments-elite-and-regulatory-capture
(explaining that ideological capture occurs when regulators "share the same beliefs and ideas as their
industry").
72. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-625, SECURITIES REGULATION:
OPPORTUNITIES ExIST TO IMPROVE SEC's OVERSIGHT OF THE FINANCIAL INDUSTRY REGULATORY
AUTHORITY 7 (2012).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 16.
75. Id.
76. See FINRA, Exchange Act Release No. 65643, 2011 WL 5097714, at *2 (ALJ Oct. 27, 2011)
(order instituting cease-and-desist) ("FINRA employees have produced altered or misleading documents
to Commission inspection staff on three separate occasions over the past eight years.").
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1. FINRA's Non-Public Public Governors
FINRA's Board of Governors often includes former high-level
industry executives as public representatives. In many instances, these
public representatives would be deemed "non-public" under FINRA's
own rules for its arbitration forum. For its board, FINRA merely requires
that its "Public Governors" not have any "material business relationship"
with a broker, a dealer, or other self-regulatory organization."7 For
arbitrators, however, FINRA clearly distinguishes between public and
non-public persons for purposes of its arbitration forum. Unlike the vague
materiality standard for board members, FINRA created bright lines for
arbitrator classifications.7 8 Notably, after years of criticism FINRA made
it possible for customer claimants to have access to an all-public
arbitration panel because of fears of pro-industry bias in the forum.79
Such fears were well-founded; arbitrator background certainly
influences outcomes for investor claimants. A recent empirical study of
arbitration outcomes found, among other things, that "arbitrators with
connections to the industry issue lower awards" in cases where a claimant
is not represented by counsel.80 This evidence might be applicable in
other contexts as well. For example, if industry connections may make
arbitrators more predisposed to favor industry defenses, longstanding
industry connections might also predispose board members to more
naturally sympathize with industry concerns.
Despite its commitment to including public representatives in its
governance process, FINRA does not provide much information about the
purportedly public representatives on its board of governors. This stands
in marked contrast to the availability of information for public
companies.8' The lack of disclosure makes it difficult to assess the
77. FINRA, BY-LAWS OF THE CORPORATION ART. I, § tt.
78. It defines non-public arbitrators as persons that, among other things, are or were "associated
with, including registered through, under, or with (as applicable): . . . a broker or a dealer" or "a mutual
fund or a hedge fund;" "an investment adviser" or were, within the last five years, "an employee of a
bank or other financial institution." FINRA, FINRA MANUAL, R. 1 2 100(p) (2015) (defining non-public
arbitrators).
79. See FINRA, FINRA MANUAL, R. 12403(c)(1)(A) (2017) ("Each separately represented party
may strike any or all of the arbitrators from the non-public arbitrator list by crossing through the names
of the arbitrators."); accord Gross, supra note 26, at 184 ("FINRA DR provides customers with the right
to select a panel consisting of no arbitrators with ties to the securities industry."); Jason M. Kueser &
Bradley Stark, Investors, Cornered Make Securities Arbitration Elective, Not Mandatory, 23 PIABA B.J.
81, 86 (2016) ("Because investor advocates successfully argued that the industry arbitrator had potential
conflicts of interest, FINRA changed the rule to allow for all public arbitration panels.").
80. Stephen J. Choi et al., The Influence of Arbitrator Background and Representation on
Arbitration Outcomes, 9 VA. L. & Bus. REv. 43, 48 (2014) ("Our results provide preliminary evidence
that FINRA's focus on arbitrator characteristics was valuable in that such characteristics do have the
capacity to affect case outcomes.").
81. See supra text accompanying notes 271-272.
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background of the public representatives named to FINRA's board. For
example, FINRA's annual report simply describes several of its
purportedly Public Governors as "retired." 8 2 The information provided
about the remaining Public Governors includes only a title or an
81affiliation.
a. Deep Industry Connections
Publicly available information from other sources reveals that the
majority of FINRA's board would likely not be deemed "public" under
FINRA's own rules for arbitrator classification because of their
longstanding industry connections.8 4 Consider the backgrounds of some
public representatives on FINRA's board. Joshua S. Levine spent the vast
majority of his career in the industry with stints at FanTex Brokerage
Services, LLC, Electronic Securities Processing, E*Trade Securities, and
Morgan Stanley.85 William H. Heyman serves on the board of directors
at the Travelers Companies (Travelers), an insurance holding company.8 6
Travelers' annual report provides more information than FINRA,
revealing that Mr. Heyman serves as Travelers' chief investment officer
and previously served in "various executive positions with Citigroup," as
"a managing director of Salomon Brothers," and as "a managing director
of Smith Barney."87
Similarly, John W. Schmidlin, another Public Governor that FINRA
identifies as "Retired," previously served as an executive for JPMorgan
Chase. In 2004, Mr. Schmidlin disclosed that he beneficially owned
270,098 shares of JPMorgan's common stock and served as one of
JPMorgan's Managing Directors.89 Whether Mr. Schmidlin continues to
82. FINRA, 2015 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 65.
83. Id.
84. It is important to note that FINRA's classifications for public and non-public arbitrators have
been criticized as, in some instances, improperly excluding persons without significant industry
connections as non-public. For example, Cornell University Law School's Securities Arbitration Clinic
and the North American Securities Administrators Association objected to FINRA's decision to classify
persons that represent investors in arbitration proceedings as "non-public." Letter from William A.
Jacobsen, Cornell Law Professor, & Nathan F. Baum, Cornell Law Student, to Brent J. Fields, SEC
Secretary, at 2-3 (Nov. 6, 2014) ("The Clinic Opposes Classifying Investor Representatives as Non-
Public."); accord Letter from William Beatty, NASAA President, to Brent J. Fields, SEC Secretary (Nov.
6, 2014) ("Applying the term 'non-public' to individuals who represent investors is an arbitrary and
incorrect application that the SEC should reject.").
85. For information about Joshua S. Levine's history of working in the industry, see
BROKERCHECK, www.brokercheck.finra.org. FINRA's rules for arbitrators classify persons that were
registered through broker dealer firms as non-public. See FINRA, FINRA MANuAL, R. 12100(p).
86. See The Travelers Companies, Inc., Annual Report 261 (Form 10-K) (Feb. 11, 2016).
87. Id. at 262.
88. FINRA, 2015 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 65.
89. JP Morgan Chase & Co., Statement of Changes in Beneficial Ownership (Form 4) (Feb. 13,
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own a substantial position in JPMorgan's stock remains unclear.
b. Divided Loyalties and Dual Roles
In some instances, public members of the FINRA Board of Governors
occupy perplexing dual roles. In many instances, FINRA's public
representatives have significant industry relationships that may make
them particularly sensitive to industry concerns.90 For example, FINRA
previously identified Robert W. Scully as "Retired" and as a "Public"
member of its Board of Governors.91 During the same period, Mr. Scully
also served as board member for KKR & Co. L.P., "a leading global
investment firm." 92 He previously served on the Bank of America Board
of Directors in 2013 and has had a "35-year career in the financial services
industry." 93 On April 5, 2016, UBS Group AG announced Mr. Scully as
a candidate for its board. 94 On May 6, 2016, Mr. Scully stepped down
from FINRA's Board of Governors.95 He won his election to UBS's
board on May 10, 2016.96 UBS is a major financial services firm that
operates affiliated broker-dealer firms regulated by FINRA. On average,
it pays members of its board of directors approximately $1.2 million per
year.
It may be difficult to switch between roles as a public representative on
FINRA's Board of Governors and a person offering to serve the
stockholder interests of a particular member firm. In one ongoing
scandal, UBS sold Puerto Rican bonds to the public even though a group
of its own brokers came up with a list of twenty-two reasons why they
thought the bonds might be bad for their clients, including "low liquidity,
2004).
90. For a discussion of ideological capture, see note 213.
91. See Benjamin P. Edwards, Selecting the Public's Representatives in the Financial Regulatory
Process, PRAWFSBLAWG (Aug. 26, 2016),
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2016/08/selecting-the-publics-representatives-in-the-
financial-regulatory-process.html.
92. KKR& CO. L.P., Annual Report 5 (Form 10-K) (Feb. 22, 2016).
93. Id. at 240.
94. UBS Publishes Agenda for the Annual General Meeting of UBS Group AG on 10 May 2016,
Bus. WiRE (Apr. 5, 2016) http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20160404006491/en/UBS-
publishes-agenda-Annual-General-Meeting-UBS.
95. Telephone Interview with FINRA Officials (Sept. 9, 2016) (notes on file with author).
96. JBS also reveals that Mr. Scully "served as a Member of the Office of the Chairman of Morgan
Stanley," as a "Managing Director at Lehman Brothers," and "as Managing Director and for Salomon
Brothers in Investment Banking and Capital Markets." Robert W. Scully, UBS,
https://www.ubs.com/globallen/about-ubs/corporate-governance/board-of-directors/cv-robert-w-
scully.html (last visited July 16, 2016).
97. See Patrick Winters & Carolyn Bandel, Swiss Boards Command Top Pay as Members Refuse
'Peanuts', BLOOMBERG (Oct. 29, 2014) http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-10-30/swiss-
boards-command-top-pay-as-members-refuse-peanuts.
5892017]
UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW
excessive leverage, oversupply and instability." 9 8 Resolving some of the
regulatory issues in 2015, UBS agreed to pay $34 million in settlements
to regulators for its sales of Puerto Rican bonds.99 FIiNRA even fined
JBS $7.5 million and required it to pay $11 million in restitution to
customers.100 After one FINRA arbitration panel awarded a customer
$1.5 million in damages, attorneys' fees, and costs, UBS issued a
statement saying that it was "disappointed with the decision to award any
damages, with which we respectfully disagree."'01 To the extent that UBS
and its shareholders would prefer to pay a reduced amount of damages in
arbitrations or regulatory actions, public members with deep industry ties
may be particularly sensitive to concerns about "excessive" liability.
Public Governors have also had significant familial connections to
FINRA's member firms. For example, Mr. Scully is married to a
managing director at a FINRA-registered firm that provides investment
banking services.' 0 2 To the extent that the Board of Governors considers
policy relevant to investment banking, close familial connections may
also create the appearance of a conflict.
To be sure, these issues may be more appearance than reality; Mr.
Scully may be entirely independent and public minded, and long-term
industry members may be particularly offended by industry wrongdoing
that besmirches the brokerage business. Financial conflicts may matter
less for the wealthy than the middle class. A long, successful career as an
investment banker may grant a fortune so large that the prospect of a
paltry additional million would have no influence on behavior. A move
from a public representative position on FINRA's board to UBS's board
may have occurred because UBS needed additional expertise to address
ongoing compliance issues. FINRA may also have benefited significantly
from the expertise accumulated over a long industry career.
Although Mr. Scully has departed FINRA's board, other perplexing
concurrent positions persist. FINRA also identifies Randal K. Quarles of
the Cynosure Group, an investment advisory firm currently managing
over a billion dollars in assets, as a "Public" member of the Board of
98. Suzanne Barlyn, Recording Shows that UBS Drove Reluctant Brokers to Sell High-Risk Puerto
Rico Funds, Bus. INSIDER (Feb. 6, 2015), http://www.businessinsider.com/r-exclusive-recording-shows-
how-ubs-drove-reluctant-brokers-to-sell-high-risk-puerto-rico-funds-2015-2.
99. Mike Chemey, UBS Unit to Pay $34 Million in Settlements Over Puerto Rico Bond Funds,
wALL ST. J. (Sept. 29, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/ubs-unit-to-pay-34-million-in-settlements-
over-puerto-rico-bond-funds-1443551291.gg.
100. Id.
101. Andrew Welsch, As Legal Bills Soar, UBS Loses Another Puerto Rico Case, ON WALL ST.
(Feb. 22, 2016), http://www.onwallstreet.com/news/as-legal-bills-soar-ubs-loses-another-puerto-rico-
case.
102. See Office of Development Communications, $20 Million Gift from Peretsman and Scully
Names Psychology Building (Oct. 18, 2012), PRINCETON U.,
https://www.princeton.edu/main/news/archive/S35/04/91K34/index.xml?section-topstories.
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Governors.o3 Mr. Quarles also serves on the Board of Directors of the
U.S. Chamber,1 04 which describes itself as the "world's largest business
organization representing the interests of more than 3 million
businesses." 05  Mr. Quarles may face a conflict of interest to the extent
that his duties to represent business perspectives and the public interest
conflict. For an example of a debate that has split business and public
advocacy groups, consider the Department of Labor's new rule imposing
a fiduciary duty on financial advisers giving advice in connection with
retirement accounts. 106  The American Association of Retired Persons
strongly supports the rule because it wants to close "loopholes in the law
that allow some financial advisers to give investment advice that earns
them a higher fee-even if it's not the best advice."1 07 The U.S. Chamber
opposes the rule and has filed a lawsuit seeing judicial action to strike it
down.10 8
Perhaps shedding some light on Mr. Quarles's views, the U.S.
Chamber led a particularly aggressive lobbying campaign opposing the
rule. According to a report published by Public Citizen, the U.S. Chamber
created "astroturf" opposition to the rule. 109 In one instance, a person that
the U.S. Chamber featured on a website showcasing small business
opposition to the rule "did not realize he was listed on the webpage as
opposing it" and asked Public Citizen, "Who do I call to get this
down?"110
103. FINRA, 2015 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 65. The publicly available Form ADV for
Cynosure Management, LLC indicates that it is an investment advisory firm with more than $1 billion of
assets under management. See also Cynosure Mgmt., LLC, Form ADV: Uniform Application for
Investment Adviser Registration and Report by Exempt Reporting Advisers 2 (Mar. 31, 2016),
http://www.adviserinfo.sec.gov/IAPD/content/ViewForn/crd-iapd-stream-pdfaspx?ORGPK=281399.
104. See Board of Directors, U.S. CHAMBER COMMERCE, https://www.uschamber.com/about-
us/board-directors (last visited July 6, 2016).
105. About the U.S Chamber, U.S. CHAMBER COMMERCE, https://www.uschamber.com/about-
us/about-the-us-chamber (last visited July 6, 2016).
106. See Conflict of Interest Final Rule, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR,
https://www.dol.gov/ebsa/regs/conflictsofinterest.html (last visited Aug. 28, 2017).
107. David Certner, Why AARP Backs a New Retirement Plan Advice Rule, AARP BLOG (July 22,
2015), http://blog.aarp.org/2015/07/22/aarp-files-comments-on-new-retirement-plan-advice-rule/.
108. See Andrew Ackerman & Leslie Scism, Obama Retirement-Savings Rule Faces Industry-Led
Court Battle, WALL ST. J. (May 31, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/industry-groups-prepare-lawsuit-
over-obama-retirement-rule-1464704230 ("Big business and financial industry trade groups are taking to
the courts. . . .").
109. PUBLIC CITIZEN, SACRIFICING THE PAWNS: HOW THE U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
RECRUITS SMALL BUSINESS OWNERS TO LOBBY AGAINST THEIR OWN SELF-INTEREST 8 (2016),
http://www.chamberofcommercewatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Sacrificing-the-Pawns-
final.pdf. The term "astroturfing" refers to manufacturing grassroots opposition to regulation on behalf
of business and industry interests. See also John Kennedy, Need a Grass-Roots Campaign? Industries
Learn How to Hire One, SUN SENTINEL (Oct. 28, 1996), http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/1996-10-
28/business/9610280244_legislators-astroturfing-lobbyist.
110. Daniel Dudis & Bartlett Naylor, Taking a Hard Look at a Campaign Critical ofa Fiduciary
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2. FINRA's Industry Governors
The independence of FINRA's public governors matters because the
industry already wields a powerful voice within FINRA, granting it
influence over FINRA's priorities.' The industry seems unlikely to
pursue investor protection at the expense of profitability. While excess
financial services fees paid on account of conflicts of interest are costly
to investors, these fees provide profits to FINRA's member firms. 1 12
Accordingly, industry representatives serving within FINRA would
seemingly prefer revenue-maximizing arrangements."13
One successful industry campaign in FINRA's 2015 Board of
Governors shows how industry members may advance industry interests.
While running to represent midsized firms on FINRA's Board of
Governors, the commendably candid Brian Kovack of Kovack Securities
stressed that his "main role would be to advocate for" stockbrokers. 114
When a follow-up question asked if he would represent investor interests,
Kovack replied, "No. I would not."'1 5  After his remarks generated
controversy, Kovack took a more diplomatic approach, stating that he
looked "forward to working with the other members of the board and with
FINRA's member firms to identify regulatory solutions that work both
for investors and for the industry.""' Kovack won his election with the
endorsement of the Financial Services Institute."'7  Kovack has
substantial familiarity with the levers of power at FINRA; he previously
Rule, N.Y. TIMES (June 9, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/10/business/dealbook/taking-a-hard-
look-at-a-campaign-critical-of-a-fiduciary-rule.html?smid-tw-nytimesbusiness&smtyp=cur& r=0.
S11. For example, FINRA's bylaws provide for substantial industry representation on the board.
FINRA BYLAWS, art. VII, § 4(a), ("[T]he Board of Governors shall consist of ... (iii) a Floor Member
Governor, an Independent Dealer/Insurance Affiliate Governor and an Investment Company Affiliate
Governor and (iv) three Small Firm Governors, one Mid-Size Firm Governor and three Large Firm
Governors.").
112. See Judge, supra note 21, at 577 ("Because fees are revenue to the intermediaries to whom
they are paid, intermediaries prefer laws, norms, market structures, and other institutional arrangements
that entail higher, not lower, transaction fees.").
113. See id. ("Moreover, intermediaries often have expertise and other strategic advantages that
enable them to affect the processes through which institutions evolve in self-serving ways.").
114. Ann Marsh, FINRA Candidate Says He'd Represent Firms, Not Investors, FIN. PLANNING
(July 6, 2015), http://www.financial-planning.com/news/finra-candidate-says-hed-represent-firms-not-
investors.
115. Id.
116. Ann Marsh, Newly Elected FINRA Leader Raises Fiduciary Hackles, FIN. PLANNING (Aug. 3,
2015), http://www.financial-planning.com/news/newly-elected-finra-leader-raises-fiduciary-hackles.
117. See Karen Demasters, Brian Kovack 'Dissident' Candidate For FINRA Board, Gets FSI
Endorsement, FIN. PLANNING (July 6, 2015), http://www.fa-mag.com/news/brian-kovack--dissident-
candadate-for-finra-board-of-govemors-22334.html (reporting Financial Services .Institute
Endorsement); Megan Leonhardt, Reformers Win Seats on FINRA Board, WEALTH MGMT. (July 30,
2015), http://wealthmanagement.com/industry/reformers-win-seats-finra-board ("Kovack and Romano,
both owners of brokerages, campaigned to be elected with a similar messages: Stop antagonizing smaller
firms.").
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served on its interim board and as a member of the NASD Board of
Governors." 8
Mr. Kovack's presence raises questions about FINRA's culture and
interest in protecting investors.119 One recent study found that, while only
about 7% of all stockbrokers have markers on their record indicating
possible misconduct, some firms have much higher concentrations of
brokers with possible misconduct markers.12 0 At Kovack Securities,
13.13% of the brokers joined the firm after being fired by other firms.1 2 1
Tendencies toward fraud and exploitation may be contagious: when
groups of troubled brokers cluster, their colleagues tend to absorb the
cultural norms.1 2 2 One study found that associating with problem brokers
increased the likelihood that even individual brokers without potentially
problematic disclosures on their records will be associated with
misconduct.1 2 3 Remarking on similar findings, two FINRA economists
recently theorized that a heightened concentration of brokers with
misconduct disclosures might serve "as an indicator of 'compliance
culture"' at a particular finn.1 2 4 The high rate of disclosures may indicate
that Kovack Securities' institutional culture does not place as much value
on compliance as other firms. A unanimous 2010 arbitration award
118. FINRA Announces Interim Board of Governors to Serve Until Annual Meeting for Board
Elections, FINRA (Aug. 2,2007), https://www.finra.org/newsroom/2007/finra-announces-interim-board-
governors-serve-until-annual-meeting-board-elections ("Brian Kovack, President of Kovack Securities
Inc. and a former member of NASD's Board of Governors, appointed by the NASD as an industry
representative. Kovack will serve only on the Interim Board.").
119. Financial regulators have begun to pay an increasing amount of attention to the culture of
financial services firms because it drives organizational behavior. See Nizan Geslevich Packin &
Benjamin P. Edwards, Regulating Culture: Improving Corporate Governance with Anti-Arbitration
Provisions for Whistleblowers, 58 WM. & MARY L. REv. ONLNE 41 (2016),
http://wmlawreview.org/sites/default/files/Packin%20%26%20Edwards-Final.pdf (corporate culture has
emerged as a regulatory priority in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis).
120. See Mark Egan et al., The Market for Financial Adviser Misconduct (Feb. 2016)
https://www.chicagobooth.edu/-/media/B76C8 1EFE39B4EDB9A4B4D8B34DOBOF7.pdf (working
paper).
121. Craig McCann et al., How Widespread and Predictable is Stock Broker Misconduct, SEC.
LITIG. CONSULTING GROUP 32 (June 2016),
http://www.slcg.com/pdf/workingpapers/McCann%20Qin%20and%2OYan%2Oon%2OBrokerCheck.pdf
122. See Stephen G. Dimmock et al., Is Fraud Contagious? Co-Worker Influence on Misconduct
by Financial Advisors 4 (July 10, 2017), https://papers.ssm.com/abstract-2577311 (unpublished
manuscript) ("Controlling for merger-firm fixed effects and using changes to an advisor's co-workers due
to a merger, we show that an advisor is 37% more likely to commit misconduct if his Introduced Branch
co-workers have a history of misconduct.").
123. Id.
124. One FINRA study found that investor risk rises when a firm has a high concentration of brokers
with potential misconduct markers on their records. See Hammad Qureshi & Jonathan S. Sokobin, Do
Investors Have Valuable Information About Brokers?, 4 (Aug. 20, 2015),
https://papers.ssm.com/abstract-2652535 ("[W]e find that [harm associated with coworkers] leads to an
economically meaningful increase in the overall power to predict investor harm, in the context of our
model.").
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provides additional support for this inference: the panel ordered Kovack
Securities to pay $200,000 in punitive damages to an investor because of
the "apparent lack of any system of supervision" at the firm.125 From his
position on FINRA's Board of Governors, Mr. Kovack may be able to
influence the organization's priorities.
While not all industry-affiliated governors share Mr. Kovack's unique
background, the need for independent public representatives remains.
Given FINRA's structure, it should be assumed that the industry will use
FINRA's regulatory apparatus to pursue its own objectives.
III. THE PUBLIC'S INTEREST IN FINANCIAL REGULATION
Evaluating financial regulation requires an understanding of the
financial system's purpose and benefits. 126 Even with this in mind, it may
be difficult to identify when self-regulatory organizations act to promote
industry interests at the public's expense. 127 In some instances, legitimate
investor protection initiatives may only win support when they grant one
subset of the industry a competitive advantage over another.
The need for effective supervision of the financial services industry has
never been greater.12 8 Ineffective financial services regulation may affect
ordinary individuals more directly than ever before by limiting their
ability to save for the future. While U.S. households once relied on
defined-benefit pensions, the national retirement landscape has shifted
toward personally controlled retirement accounts, such as 401(k)s and
Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs). 129 This structure forces average,
financially illiterate citizens to bear the responsibility for allocating their
own retirement savings. 130  Amplifying the challenge, retirement-aged
125. Tarrant v. Kovack Sec Inc., Arb. No. 10-03532, at 2 (FINRA Feb. 13, 2012) ("The situation is
more egregious given [that Kovack Securities] was aware the broker had been terminated from another
firm due to unreported and unapproved outside activities.").
126. Jeffrey N. Gordon & Lewis A. Komhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly Information, and
Securities Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 761, 765 (1985) (explaining that policymakers must keep in mind
"the functions that capital markets ideally serve, [to] better understand what benefits we are able to achieve
with legal policy").
127. See Birdthistle & Henderson, supra note 2, at 12 ("The problem that observers encounter in
evaluating the efficacy and legitimacy of self-regulation is that the steps to create and enforce a cartel are
hard to distinguish from steps necessary to help investors through the policing of bad brokers.").
128. See id. at 33 ("[Mlore average investors find themselves in the equities market[,] ... the stakes
for them of effective regulation are higher than they were in the past.").
129. For a thorough discussion of this change and its implications, see JACOB S. HACKER, THE
GREAT RISK SHIFT: THE NEW ECONOMIC INSECURITY AND THE DECLINE OF THE AMERICAN DREAM
(2008); Edward A. Zelinsky, The Defined Contribution Paradigm, 114 YALE L.J. 451, 453 (2004)
("Pension cognoscenti have frequently remarked on the stagnation of defined benefit pensions and the
concomitant rise of defined contribution plans.").
130. See Anne Tucker, Retirement Revolution: Unmitigated Risks in the Defined Contribution
Society, 51 Hous. L. REv. 153, 188 (2013) (documenting widespread financial illiteracy); Jacob Hale
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persons, many facing cognitive decline, now form the fastest growing
cohort of the U.S. population.' 3 1  Many turn to financial advisers for
assistance in managing their retirement savings.' 3 2  Many of these
financial advisers are commission-compensated stockbrokers associated
with FINRA's member firms.' 3 3 These financial advisers frequently give
skewed, self-serving advice.' 34 By one conservative estimate, Americans
pay an excess $17 billion in annual fees because of industry conflicts of
interest. 135 A focus on fees may understate the true costs because savers
do not earn interest on the funds they have lost to industry fees.
While individuals making savings decisions face personally high
stakes, the general public has an even more compelling interest in
improving capital allocation.1 36  When functioning well, the financial
Russell, The Separation of Intelligence and Control: Retirement Savings and the Limits of Soft
Paternalism, 6 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 35, 47 (2015) (explaining that it is "clear is that many
individuals make poor decisions in investing their defined-contribution assets . . . . This is hardly
surprising given the voluminous evidence both on low financial literacy and on behavioral and cognitive
biases.").
131. See Carrie A. Weiner, The Older Population: 2010, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Nov. 2011),
https://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c20Obr-09.pdf; 2012 Alzheimer's Disease Facts and
Figures, ALZHEIMER'S ASS'N 14 (2012), https://www.alz.org/downloads/facts figures.2012.pdf
(explaining that 13% of persons over 65, and 45% of persons over 85, suffer from dementia).
132. Most use the assistance of a financial advisor to craft a retirement plan. Lydia Saad, U.S.
Investors Seek Advice for Some Things More Than Others, GALLUP (Sept. 12, 2014),
http://www.gallup.com/poll/175748/investors-seek-advice-things-
others.aspx?utm-source-tagrss&utm medium=rss&utm_campaign=syndication&utm reader-feedly.
133. The term "financial advisor" includes a variety of financial services professionals, often
stockbrokers. See Rules and Resources, FINRA, https://www.finra.org/investors/rules-and-resources (last
visited Jan. 16, 2016) (explaining that FINRA does not closely regulate the titles used by persons
associated with its members and that "Financial Analyst, Financial Adviser (Advisor), Financial
Consultant, Financial Planner, Investment Consultant or Wealth Manager are generic terms or job titles,
and may be used by investment professionals who may not hold any specific credential").
134. One study found that persons that used a broker for assistance constructed substantially worse
portfolios than the portfolios that were constructed without a broker's assistance. See generally John
Chalmers & Jonathan Reuter, Is Conflicted Investment Advice Better Than No Advice? (Nat'l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 18158, 2012), http://www.nber.org/papers/wl8158; Sendhil
Mullainathan, Markus Noeth & Antoinette Schoar, The Market for Financial Advice: An Audit Study
(Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 17929, 2012), http://www.nber.org/papers/wl7929
(finding that stockbrokers showed a bias toward recommending high fee mutual funds that would pay
more compensation to the stockbrokers).
135. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS, THE EFFECTS OF
CONFLICTED INVESTMENT ADVICE ON RETIREMENT SAVINGS 2 (Feb. 2015) (finding "the aggregate
annual cost of conflicted advice is about $17 billion each year" for retirement savers) [hereinafter CEA,
CONFLICTED ADVICE]. In practical terms, retirees receiving conflicted advice will run out of savings
more than five years earlier than if they had received unbiased advice. Id. When these retirees deplete
their savings, they may consume more public resources or depend on support from their families, reducing
the next generation's ability to save and invest for the future.
136. Charles K. Whitehead, Reframing Financial Regulation, 90 B.U. L. REv. 1, 35 (2010) ("The
basic goals of the markets have remained the same - namely, the efficient allocation, transfer, and
deployment of capital resources and risk-bearing."); See also Lynn A. Stout, The Corporation As Time
Machine: Intergenerational Equity, Intergenerational Efficiency, and the Corporate Form, 38 SEATTLE
U. L. REv. 685, 686 (2015) (explaining that capital markets "can transform wealth that will be generated
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system efficiently transfers investor capital to productive opportunities.
This produces benefits for all parties. Investors earn risk-adjusted returns,
businesses put money to work, and financial intermediaries collect fees
for their services. Importantly, the efficiency of capital allocation may be
measured as the cost of moving capital from savers to profitable
opportunities. 137 If the market for financial intermediation were truly
competitive, competition between profit-seeking financial intermediaries
would drive down the fees charged for financial intermediation, freeing
more investor capital for productive use.
A. Reduce Intermediation Costs
Excessive fees for self-regulating intermediaries may mean that
otherwise value-increasing transactions will never occur.138 For example,
imagine that Afra and Beydoun place different values on an asset. If the
asset is worth 100 to Afra and 105 to Beydoun, it would make sense for
Afra to sell the asset to Beydoun. When Afra and Beydoun do not know
each other or transact directly, an intermediary may profit by connecting
them. If Cathren, the intermediary, extracts a fee of 10, the transaction
will never occur. Afra will only be willing to sell the asset for something
more than 100. Beydoun will not pay 110 for asset valued at 105.
At present, the transaction fees for ordinary stock market transactions
have declined substantially because of repeated outside intervention. For
example, the self-regulatory exchanges maintained artificially high,
fixed-rate commissions for all stock transactions until the SEC abolished
the practice in 1975.139 Even after the SEC abolished fixed commissions,
industry members colluded to raise trading costs indirectly by
in the future into wealth that can be enjoyed today in the form of a higher share price"); JOHN KAY, OTHER
PEOPLE'S MONEY: THE REAL BUSINESS OF FINANCE 135 (2015) ("A central function of financial markets
is to direct money from savers to businesses, home-owners and governments. They in turn use these
savings to build, own and operate houses, shops, offices, warehouses and factories .... ); Kathryn Judge,
Fee Effects, 98 IOWA L. REv. 1517, 1539 (2013) ("[T]he intermediary plays a critical role linking (and
separating) the investor, on one hand, and the project in which his money is ultimately invested on the
other.").
137. See Wallace C. Turbeville, A New Perspective on the Costs and Benefits of Financial
Regulation: Inefficiency of Capital Intermediation in A Deregulated System, 72 MD. L. REv. 1173, 1176
(2013) ("[T]he principal social value of financial markets is not to assure the lowest transaction costs for
market participants. Rather, it is to facilitate the efficient deployment of funds held by investors to
productive uses.").
138. See Judge, supra note 21, at 625.
139. Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Transformation of the US. Financial Services Industry, 1975-
2000: Competition, Consolidation, and Increased Risks, 2002 U. ILL. L. REv. 215, 408 (2002) ("The
abolition of fixed-rate brokerage commissions in 1975 transformed the economics of the securities
industry.").
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manipulating the bid-ask spread for stocks. 140  In the so-called "odd-
eighth" affair, academics published research indicating that market-
makers were colluding to inflate trading costs.1 4 1
Notably, these reductions in trading costs came through outside
pressure from government and as a result of academic research, not from
a self-regulatory body acting to curb transaction costs. In fact, FINRA's
precursor knowingly tolerated the problem. After the odd-eighth scandal,
the SEC released a report on the fiasco, known as the "2 1(a) Report." 42
The report revealed that industry members had "engaged in a variety of
abusive practices to suppress competition and mislead customers" and
that the self-regulatory organization had done nothing about it despite
knowing the "facts and circumstances" for a substantial time. 143
B. Mitigate Capital Misallocation and Conflicts ofInterest
The public's interest in efficient capital allocation may also be undercut
when conflicts of interest cause financial intermediaries to misallocate
capital.1 44 Conflicts of interest sometimes cause intermediaries to steer
clients away from the most productive opportunities and toward
transactions that increase intermediary profits.1 4 5  The misdirection of
investor capital to secure transaction fees means that the financial system
will allocate capital in suboptimal ways.
This problem may be particularly acute in the retail sector, where a
substantial sophistication gap often exists between commission-
compensated financial advisers and their clients.1 4 6 These advisers face
an ever-present incentive to tilt their advice in ways that increase their
own compensation. 147  When consumers fail to understand complex
financial products, financial advisers may more easily steer them toward
relatively poorer choices. 14 8 For most retail customers, these higher-fee
140. See William G. Christie & Paul H. Schultz, Policy Watch: Did Nasdaq Market Makers
Implicitly Collude?, 9 J. ECON. PERSP. 199, 200-01 (1995); William G. Christie & Paul H. Schultz, Why
Do NASDAQ Market Makers Avoid Odd-Eighth Quotes?, 49 J. FiN. 1813 (1994).
141. Id.
142. NASD & Nasdaq, Report Pursuant to Section 2 1(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(1996) [hereinafter SEC, 21A Report].
143. Id. at 1.
144. See Edwards, supra note 19, at 188-194 (discussing capital misallocation).
145. Judge, supra note 136, at 1530-31 (explaining that social costs can take the form of foregone
gains).
146. See Edwards, supra note 19, at 190 (discussing sophistication gap).
147. See Benjamin P. Edwards, Fiduciary Duty and Investment Advice: Will A Uniform Fiduciary
Duty Make A Material Difference?, J. BUS. & SEC. L., Spring 2014, at 105, 121 ("These distorting
incentives have long been recognized as creating material conflicts between the Broker's interests and the
client's interests.").
148. See Barbara Black, Curbing Broker-Dealers' Abusive Sales Practices: Does Professor
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transactions will rarely be the most prudent decision. 14 9
When financial-adviser conflicts of interest induce poor capital
allocation decisions, it harms individuals and the economy as a whole.`0
For individuals, purchasing a higher-fee product may result in significant
changes to retirement outcomes. For example, consider the different
outcomes for investors purchasing otherwise-identical index funds with
different fee levels. Class L shares of the Great-West S&P 500 Index
Fund cost 0.85% in annual fees to replicate the performance of the S&P
500 index.151 In contrast, Vanguard also provides a S&P 500 Index Fund
that charges 0.05% in annual fees. 152  Over time, these fee differences
become significant.1 5 3 If the S&P rises 6.5% for twenty years, $100,000
in the Great West fund will increase to $297,281.31, with $30,782.88
going to fees over the years. In contrast, the lower-fee fund will rise to
$348,858.72 and cost less than $2,000 in fees.1 5 4
Collectively, retail investors control a vast pool of capital. Given the
social problems that flow from transactional fees and capital
misallocation, the public has a strong interest in reforms that tend to
improve how retail investors allocate capital.155  Incentives toward
misallocation and inefficiency can drive many problems, ranging from
misdirected financial innovation1 5 6 to increases in the cost of capital, as
Jensen's Integrity Framework Offer A Better Approach?, 48 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 771, 772 (2013)
("Because of investors' general low level of financial literacy and the complexity of investment products,
it is difficult for most retail customers to assess the investment choices recommended by the registered
representatives who service their accounts."); Lauren E. Willis, Performance-Based Consumer Law, 82
U. CHI. L. REV. 1309, 1311 (2015) ("In a growing number of consumer transactions today, firms exploit
consumer confusion and promote poor buying choices. The resulting transactions are often lousy, whether
one uses autonomy, welfare, or fairness as the metric.").
149. One former stockbroker coined "Brown's law of brokerage product compensation," instructing
that "[t]he higher the commission or selling concession a broker is paid to sell a product, the worse that
product will be for his or her clients." JOSHUA M. BROWN, BACKSTAGE WALL STREET: AN INSIDER'S
GUIDE To KNOWING WHO TO TRUST, WHO To RUN FROM, AND How TO MAXIMIZE YOUR INVESTMENTS
217-18 (2012).
150. Jacob Hale Russell has explained that retail investors purchase higher-fee funds because their
financial advisers are paid kickbacks for selling them higher-fee funds. Russell, supra note 130, at 57
(explaining that people pick high-fee funds because of an "advice-giver who is financially incentivized
through (entirely legal) direct or indirect kickbacks").
151. For a copy of the prospectus, see Great-West S&P 500 Index L MXVJX, MORNINGSTAR,
http://quicktake.morningstar.com/syndication/filing.aspx?cn=GLGl17&symbol=MXVJX (last visited
Oct. 12, 2016).
152. For a copy of the prospectus, see Vanguard S&P 500 Index Fund ETF Class (NYSE Arca
VOO), VANGUARD, https://personal.vanguard.comi/us/stocks/prospectus?Ticker-VOO (last visited Oct.
12, 2016).
153. FINRA's "Fund Analyzer" performs these calculations. Fund Analyzer, FINRA,
http://apps.finra.org/fundanalyzer/l/fa.aspx (last visited Oct. 12, 2016).
154. Id.
155. See Edwards, supra note 19.
156. See Brian J. Henderson & Neil D. Pearson, The Dark Side of Financial Innovation: A Case
Study of the Pricing of a Retail Financial Product, 100 J. FIN. ECON. 227, 228 (2011) (concluding that
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issuers seek to induce sales through payments to financial
intermediaries.' 5 7
IV. A CRITICAL VIEW OF INDUSTRY SELF-REGULATION
A variety of arguments have been made in favor of FINRA's self-
regulatory model. This Article carefully considers some of the most
prominent justifications for self-regulation.
A. Traditional Justifications for Self-Regulation
1. The Limited Economic Incentive to Self-Police
The main premise behind self-regulation is that "the industry has a
strong incentive to police itself in order to maintain its quality."15  This
incentive to self-police exists when "many of the costs of misbehavior are
born by all members of the profession while the benefits inure only to the
misbehaving few."l59 Notice here that profit-seeking industry self-
regulators will likely define "misbehavior" as actions that impose costs or
reduce the profits of the industry as a whole-not necessarily as activities
that reduce investor welfare or generate costs elsewhere.' 60 For example,
self-regulating manufacturers may not limit environmental pollution
because distant customers do not bear the environmental costs generated
by their operations.1 61  Their customers may even prefer pollution-
spewing factories because they pay less for goods and bear no liability for
the environmental cleanup.
The NYSE's history as a self-regulating exchange bears this out.
Traditionally, the NYSE aggressively policed its own ranks to prevent its
members from undercutting the standard fixed commission rates. 162 It did
retail investors pay, on average, an 8% premium over fair market value for certain complex financial
products).
157. Cf Ralph K. Winter, Paying Lawyers, Empowering Prosecutors, and Protecting Managers:
Raising the Cost of Capital in America, 42 DUKE L.J. 945 (1993) ("The lower the cost of capital to a
nation's entrepreneurs, the more that will be purchased.").
158. COFFEE ET AL., supra note 23, at 690.
159. Birdthistle & Henderson, supra note 2, at 8.
160. Cf Kristin N. Johnson, Governing Financial Markets: Regulating Conflicts, 88 WASH. L. REV.
185, 203 (2013) ("The monitoring and enforcement policies that [self-regulatory] governing authorities
adopt do not, however, always align with federal policies or regulatory goals.").
161. See, e.g., Birdthistle & Henderson, supra note 2, at 9 ("Pollution may be profit maximizing for
firms in the absence of regulation because costs (such as damage to air, vegetation, or water) are imposed
on others.").
162. Institution ofExperience: Coherence ofthe Self-Regulatory Regime, supra note 30 ("From the
first, however, this member-controlled regime inevitably favored the floor over the investors that it served,
particularly in enforcement.").
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not, however, aggressively police its members' extraordinarily profitable
market-manipulating stock pools.1 63  The incentive to self-police,
therefore, failed to check exploitation of the public for at least two
reasons: (i) the NYSE members that did not participate in the stock pools
still profited because of the heightened trading volume;' 64 and (ii) the
stock pool operators controlled the NYSE governing committee.' 65
The incentive to self-police may also have been limited because Wall
Street's broker-dealer firms internalized only a limited portion of the costs
that their misbehavior imposed on the public. In theory, contractual
relationships between broker-dealer firms and their customers should
allow customers to impose costs incurred from misbehavior and
disloyalty on the industry.' 66  When contractual relationships do not
transfer the costs of misbehavior back to the industry, this incentive to
self-police diminishes.
In practice, arbitration contracts may inhibit this feedback
mechanism.1 67  Nearly all customers of FINRA's member firms are
required to sign arbitration agreements when they open their accounts.' 68
This means that any dispute arising later must be resolved within
FINRA's proprietary arbitration forum.' 69  Significant portions of the
investing public with relatively modest claims may struggle to find
representation or to pay "upfront costs such as filing fees, forum fees, and
expert witness fees" that are often necessary to proceed.1 70  Even if an
investor manages to secure an award in the industry forum, there is a
163. See, e.g., PERrNO, supra note 32, at 269 (explaining that although "[e]veryone in the country
seemed to know that there was a pool of R.C.A. stock organized . .. by Michael Meehan, a specialist and
member of the [NYSE]" that "netted participants $5 million in one week," the NYSE "didn't see the need
to investigate it until the summer of 1932").
164. Cf DOUGLAS, supra note 43, at 292 (relating the tale of how a Goldman Sachs representative
complained to the SEC about the reduced trading volume after the New Deal).
165. See Institution of Experience: Public Relations and Partial Reforms, supra note 33 ("[T]he
real power at the NYSE-the governing committee-was dominated by the floor traders and specialists
who considered pools to be prerequisites of the trade."); accord Birdthistle & Henderson, supra note 2, at
8 (noting that the self-regulatory process would not work if the misbehaving few gain control). -
166. In theory, self-regulation may function better in the broker-dealer industry than in the
manufacturing business because "the harm caused by bad brokers . . . is primarily home by the individuals
who are in a contractual relationship with the broker." Birdthistle & Henderson, supra note 2, at 10.
167. See Jill E. Fisch, Top Cop or Regulatory Flop? The SEC at 75, 95 VA. L. REv. 785, 802 (2009)
("For years, critics have charged that the system is biased in favor of the industry, yet FINRA has failed
to provide sufficient transparency to test this claim empirically.").
168. Jill Gross, The Improbable Birth and Conceivable Death of the Securities Arbitration Clinic,
15 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 597, 598-99 (2014) ("Virtually all broker-dealers-and many
investment advisors-now include a pre-dispute arbitration clause in their retail customers' account
agreements.").
169. Id. at 599 (explaining that these clauses mean that customers must "arbitrate th[eir] claims in
the FINRA arbitration forum" instead of resolving them in court proceedings).
170. Id. at 600.
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strong chance that the award may never be paid.171 One recent study
found that approximately one out of every three FINRA arbitration
awards goes unpaid.1 72  This accountability breakdown means that the
industry has no need to self-police as vigorously as it would if the costs
were borne by the industry.1 73
2. Regulatory Expertise and Flexibility
FINRA's self-regulatory structure may generate more thoughtful and
precise regulation by bringing industry experts into the regulatory
process.174 Industry participants will always know more about their
operations and business model than more distant government
regulators. '71
Additionally, regulatory expertise is particularly valuable when
overseeing the modern, highly complex financial market place.1 76 In the
aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, a key finding emerged-many
government regulators did not understand the industries they were
supposedly monitoring.'7 7  To partially overcome this problem, some
evidence indicates that FINRA at least listens closely to industry member
concerns. For example, current FINRA Governor Brian Kovack
previously served as a FINRA District Committee Member.1 78  He
reported that FINRA provided him with a secure portal to submit
171. See Per Jebsen, How to Fix Unpaid Arbitration Awards, 26 PACE L. REv. 183, 183 (2005)
("[I]n a significant fraction of cases, an investor with a duly obtained award is simply never paid, usually
because the errant brokerage firm or broker has gone out of business.").
172. HUGH D. BERKSON, UNPAID ARBITRATION AWARDS: A PROBLEM THE INDUSTRY CREATED-
A PROBLEM THE INDUSTRY MUST Fix 2 (2016),
https://piaba.org/system/files/pdfs/Unpaid%20Arbitration%20Awards%20-
%20A%20Problem%20The%201ndustry%2OCreated%20-
%20A%20Problem%20The%201ndustry/o2OMust%20Fix%20(February%2025,%202016).pdf.
173. See Benjamin P. Edwards, Why Broker-Dealers and Financial Advisers Should Be Required
to Carry Insurance, INVESTMENTNEWS (Jun. 15, 2016),
http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20160615/BLOG09/160619954/why-broker-dealers-and-
financial-advisers-should-be-required-to (arguing that an insurance-type scheme would cause the industry
to internalize the costs it imposes on investors).
174. Birdthistle & Henderson, supra note 2, at 55 ("[T]he greatest single benefit that self-regulation
possesses . . . is its access to direct industry expertise.").
175. See Dorit Rubinstein Reiss, The Benefits of Capture, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 569, 597
(2012) ("It is the industry people who work on the ground and know what is really happening.").
176. See Johnson, supra note 160, at 203 ("Deferring to SROs allows government regulators to
benefit from SRO boards of directors and governing committees' sophisticated understanding of
conventional and exotic financial instruments.").
177. Cf BOSTON CONSULTING GRP., U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION:
ORGANIZATIONAL STUDY AND REFORM 59-60 (2011) (finding that "senior SEC managers described the
staff's understanding of market technologies as 'basic' and expressed a clear interest to invest in additional
resources").
178. See FIN. SERV. INST., FSIVOICE: FINRA DISTRICT COMMITTEE MEMBERS 14 (2015).
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concerns, access to senior leaders, and thoughtful consideration of any
issues he raised. 7 9
Still, the potential for easier access to industry expertise does not
guarantee that FINRA will deploy that expertise effectively in overseeing
its members.' 8 0 In fact, one danger is that expertise will be used to craft
easily evaded, loophole-ridden rules. For example, Jill Fisch and Hillary
Sale criticized the NASD's oversight of analyst conflicts as
insufficient.' 8 ' They explained that even after reform, "the rules remain
fraught with loopholes."' 82
Importantly, analyst regulation impacts the public more than industry
insiders. Industry members have long known that many analyst reports
were little more than marketing materials. In contrast, the public investors
that rely on analyst research often fail to appreciate the conflicts of
interest, and thus fall victim to industry conflicts.
3. Improved Compliance and Rulemaking
One traditional rationale for self-regulation is that close industry
participation generates compliance benefits because the industry may be
more likely to comply with internally generated rules than externally
imposed ones.1 83 At the least, industry participation in the rulemaking
process likely increases the perceived legitimacy of any rule imposed by
a regulator. Industry participation theoretically also expedites the
rulemaking process by generally improving the flow of information from
the regulated to the regulator.
Yet self-regulation does not ensure complete compliance. Some
evidence indicates that broker-dealer firms may not feel morally bound to
comply with industry-made rules. For example, Harry Markopolos, the
financial analyst that repeatedly tipped off the SEC about Madoff s fraud
years before the record-shattering Ponzi scheme collapsed, reports that
when he began working in the industry he learned "that dishonest actions
also had consequences-often you ended up making a lot more
money."' 84 He explained that after he learned the industry's regulations,
179. Id.
180. Indeed, FINRA's lax oversight of the securities industry has attracted substantial criticism.
See Fisch, supra note 167, at 800 ("Although it is difficult to ascertain the effectiveness of FINRA's
oversight from its disclosures, there have been obvious shortcomings.").
181. See Jill E. Fisch & Hillary A. Sale, The Securities Analyst as Agent: Rethinking the Regulation
ofAnalysts, 88 IOWA L. REv. 1035, 1043-45 (2003) (reporting findings that the NYSE and the NASD
failed to enforce rules governing analyst conflicts of interest effectively).
182. Id. at 1074.
183. See COFFEE ET AL., supra note 23, at 688 ("[S]elf-regulation invites the participation of the
regulated, thereby increasing the prospect of law compliance.").
184. HARRY MARKOPOLOS, No ONE WOULD LISTEN: A TRUE FINANCIAL THRILLER 13 (2010).
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he "saw them broken every day, every hour; and everybody knew about
it and nobody seemed to care."' 85
Many industry members share Markopolos' assessment about the rate
of compliance. One recent survey found that 23% of financial services
employees believe it likely "that fellow employees have engaged in illegal
or unethical activity in order to gain an advantage over competitors or
others at the company."' 86 The same study found that about 25% of the
industry believed that industry members "must at least sometimes engage
in illegal or unethical activity to be successful."' 8 7
a. Cost Avoidance
Self-regulation has also been promoted on the ground that it provides
significant cost savings.' 8 8 In theory, its greater expertise should allow it
to function more cost effectively because it would enjoy lower
information-acquisition and analysis cost as well as the support of the
industry.1 89 FINRA also enjoys the ability to tax its members, supporting
its operations through industry fees instead of taxpayer dollars.' 90 In
contrast, the SEC's operations may be inhibited by limited appropriations
from Congress.
Self-regulatory organizations may also be able to act more efficiently
because they do not face the same constraints as state actors. Still, they
may increase coordination costs for working with state actors because
they may resist coordinated action to avoid being characterized as an arm
of the state. For example, Steven Irwin, the Pennsylvania Securities
Commissioner, testified before Congress in 2011 that FINRA had resisted
cooperation with state regulators out of an "extreme sensitivity to being
labeled a state actor."' 91
Of course, the old adage, "you get what you pay for" has some
applicability. Because industry firms pay for their regulation, they may
receive significant benefits. To the extent it generates more responsive
185. Id. at 14-15 ("These were clear felonies and the NASD didn't even respond," despite
documented complaints.).
186. ANN TENBRUNSEL & JORDAN THOMAS, U. OF NOTRE DAME & LABATON SUCHAROw LLP,
THE STREET, THE BULL AND THE CRISIS: A SURVEY OF THE US & UK FINANCIAL SERVICES INDUSTRY 4
(May 2015), https://www.secwhistlebloweradvocate.com/pdf/Labaton-2015-Survey-report_12.pdf.
187. Id. at 3.
188. See Birdthistle & Henderson, supra note 2, at 57.
189. See id.
190. See COFFEE ET AL., supra note 23, at 685.
191. Ensuring Appropriate Regulatory Oversight ofBroker-Dealers and Legislative Proposals To
Improve Investment Advisor Oversight: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Capital Mkts. & Gov't
Sponsored Enterprises, 112th Cong. (2011) (statement of Steven D. Irwin, Commissioner, Pennsylvania
Securities Commission, and Chairman, Federal Legislative Committee of the North American Securities
Administrators Association, Inc.).
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and efficient regulators, self-regulation serves a useful purpose. Evidence
also indicates that self-regulating firms may "get" a regulatory
environment that maintains higher fees for financial intermediaries.1 9 2
Notably, Thomas Philippon's review found that the costs of financial
intermediation have not decreased in a century despite improvements in
information technology. 19 3 Thus, the public does not experience net cost
savings if self-regulation leads to costlier financial intermediation.
Putting aside the excessive cost of financial intermediation, some
skeptics doubt that the use of a self-regulatory organization actually
decreases the cost of oversight. Rather, inserting the self-regulatory
structure may simply add another layer of oversight and increase overall
costs.1 9 4  To function effectively, these skeptics suggest that any self-
regulatory organization will undoubtedly need to create a bureaucracy
similar in size and scope to the organization that would be created by a
government regulator.
195
B. Self-Regulation's Risks
While a well-functioning self-regulatory structure offers numerous
benefits, it also comes with significant risks, which, if unchecked, may
swamp any benefits obtained through the self-regulatory structure. At
base, many issues stem from core conflicts of interests between the
regulatory duties of self-regulatory organizations and their members'
interests. 196
Given these conflicts of interest, most observers accept that self-
regulatory organizations often fail to effectively protect the public's
interests.19 7  Still, insights into how to improve organizational
192. See Judge, supra note 21, at 610 (explaining that financial market intermediaries often "impede
the evolution of market structures toward more-efficient forms").
193. See Philippon, supra note 12, at 5.
194. See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-i1-623, PRIVATE FUND ADVISERS:
ALTHOUGH A SELF-REGULATORY ORGANIZATION COULD SUPPLEMENT SEC OVERSIGHT, IT WOULD
PRESENT CHALLENGES AND TRADE-OFFs 20 (2011) [hereinafter GAO, CHALLENGES & TRADE-OFFS]
(explaining that the SRO structure may "increase the overall cost of regulation by adding another layer of
oversight").
195. Miller, supra note 14, at 862 (explaining that not "much attention has been given, however, to
how this industry expertise is conscripted").
196. See Concept Release Concerning Self-Regulation, Exchange Act Release No. 50700, 2004
WL 2648179, at *6 (Nov. 18, 2004) [hereinafter SEC Concept Release] ("Among the most controversial
features of the existing SRO system is the inherent conflict that exists within every SRO between its
regulatory functions and its members, market operations, listed issuers, and shareholders.").
197. See Karmel, supra note 2, at 197 ("[C]riticism of SROs as being insufficiently responsive to
the public interest has been leveled over the years by Congress . . . ."); David G. Tittsworth, H.R. 4624:
The Pitfalls ofA Self-Regulatory Organization for Investment Advisers and Why User Fees Would Better
Accomplish the Goal ofinvestment Adviser Accountability, 87 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 477,483 (2013) ("[T]he
effectiveness of SROs has not been demonstrated."); Orenbach, supra note 56, at 152 ("FINRA has a
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performance emerge from careful review of the different ways in which
this failure occurs.
1. Cartelization
One of self-regulation's major dangers is that it may give industry
members "the ability to reduce competition and to raise their own
profits."' 9 8 This problem, known as "cartelization," manifests itself as the
tendency for "industry to protect itself from external competition or
regulation that might be social welfare enhancing."' 99
Particular groups within self-regulatory organizations may also use
their regulatory power in anticompetitive ways by crafting regulations
that disproportionately burden their competitors. 2 00  In particular,
regulations imposing fixed costs that do not scale with firm size may have
more significant effects on small firms.
It may not always be possible to discern whether a self-regulatory
organization seeks to protect the public or to limit the ability of new
entrants to drive down costs. Consider, for example, the emergence of
so-called robo-advisers. 201 Financial technology companies have begun
to offer automated investment advice platforms that use algorithms to
select assets for investors. In many instances, these robo-advisers provide
services at a fraction of the cost.202  Responding to their emergence,
FINRA recently released a report discussing how existing FINRA
obligations apply to robo-advice platforms.2 03 While the existing
obligations provide investor protections, they also create compliance
costs and may make it more difficult for new entrants. In this context, it
is difficult to distinguish legitimate investor protection initiatives from
interventions designed to drive up costs for a potentially disruptive
competitor.
track record of missing many of the major scandals in the securities industry."); MARKOPOLOS, supra note
184, at 229 (testifying before Congress that self-regulatory organizations "were there to assist industry in
avoiding stricter regulation from the SEC").
198. Birdthistle & Henderson, supra note 2, at 10.
199. COFFEE ET AL., supra note 23, at 692; accord Miller, supra note 14, at 867-68.
200. See Birdthistle & Henderson, supra note 2, at 48 ("For large broker-dealers, not only are
compliance costs of little harm (if they amount to an industry-wide tax), but they may be valuable.").
201. See Anne Tergesen, Robo Advisers Seen Exploding in Popularity, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 11,
2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/robo-advisers-seen-exploding-in-popularity-
1449860367?cb-loggedO.12484590127132833 (explaining that robo-advice "firms typically use
algorithms to recommend and manage portfolios of low-cost funds for investors, including implementing
tax-saving trades").
202. Id.
203. FINRA, REPORT ON DIGITAL INVESTMENT ADVICE - 1 (Mar. 2016),
http://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/digital-investment-advice-report.pdf.
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2. Regulatory Capture
The literature on regulatory capture explains mechanisms through
which industry may influence regulatory activity. 204 While the term has
been used in many different ways, it generally "denotes the misalignment
of incentives of government actors who pursue narrow private interests
that may conflict with the public interest they purport to serve." 205 in
addition to this definition, scholars suggest that capture may best be
understood as a question of degree.206 At one extreme, a "captured"
regulator would act entirely in the interest of the industry. Yet capture's
effects also appear in subtler manifestations. Some have even expressed
concern that close connections may generate sympathy or lax
enforcement. 207 Perspective remains important when seeking reform.
Regulators will likely not improve outcomes or protect the public by
fostering hostile relationships with the industry. 2 0 8
The existence of a "revolving door" between positions in regulation
and industry does not always mean that officials will shirk enforcement
when in regulatory positions.209 In fact, regulators eyeing a move to the
industry side face incentives even to over-enforce rules or over-regulate.
For example, a number of headline-grabbing enforcement actions can
signal a particular official's talent and competitive zeal. 21 0  Industry
employers looking to acquire talent may pay a premium for a star.
Regulators may also have incentives to elevate an industry's regulatory
burden to increase the industry's need to hire former regulators for
compliance positions.2 1 '
At present, most observers conclude that the regulation of financial
services exhibits a high degree of capture.2 12 FINRA may exhibit higher
204. See Saule T. Omarova, Bankers, Bureaucrats, and Guardians: Toward Tripartism in Financial
Services Regulation, 37 J. CORP. L. 621, 629 (2012) (describing regulatory capture).
205. Id. at 630.
206. See David Freeman Engstrom, Corralling Capture, 36 HARv. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 31,33 (2013)
("Legal scholars and political scientists now also talk about 'strong' versus 'weak' forms of capture.").
207. Veronica Root, Modern-Day Monitorships, 33 YALE J. ON REG. 109, 144 (2016) ("Scholars
have expressed concern that such a close relationship could lead to sympathy from the regulator or monitor
toward the organization that engaged in misconduct as well as 'lax enforcement."').
208. See Reiss, supra note 175, at 610 ("A blanket condemnation of close relationships between
industry and regulators by naming them capture is problematic and can lead to sacrificing potential
advantages.").
209. See Wentong Zheng, The Revolving Door, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1265, 1266 (2015).
210. Id. at 1276-80 ("[W]hen industry employers look for regulatory expertise in their agency hires,
regulators will have incentives to be more aggressive towards the industry as a way of demonstrating that
they possess the qualities sought by the employers.").
211. Id. at 1281 ("[R]egulators who contemplate moving to the private sector may focus their efforts
not on whether the rules they are making are friendly or unfriendly to their prospective industry employers,
but on whether the rules are broad enough and complex enough to require expertise in interpretation.").
212. See Omarova, supra note 204, at 630 ("In the financial services sector, regulatory capture is
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degrees of capture than traditional regulators because industry members
both make and abide by regulations at the same time. At the very least,
however, concurrent self-regulators and industry members do not need to
demonstrate administrative vigor or create additional regulatory burdens
to secure jobs that they already have.
To be sure, self-regulatory organizations also employ independent staff
who may face the same incentives as traditional agency staff. But because
these counterbalancing incentives operate with less strength, self-
regulatory organizations still may be more prone to acting in the
industry's interest than are traditional administrative agencies.
Even with independent, effective, and competent frontline personnel,
financial regulators may perform poorly if the "message from the top
skews their effectiveness." 213 For example, an organization's board may
reduce enforcement budgets or issue directives to expedite oversight
examinations. While it is not clear whether FINRA personnel share his
beliefs, FINRA Board of Governors' member Brian Kovack campaigned
on a promise to seek "'immediate reforms' in FINRA's arbitration
process, oversight examinations, and required disclosures. 214  To
whatever extent that personally independent, lower-level FINRA
employees believe in the need for more vigorous enforcement, they may
face pressure from the organization's leadership to reduce enforcement
vigor, against the public's interest.
Maintaining an incentive to act in the public's interest is particularly
important because potent structural forces also drive regulatory
capture.215 Unlike the widely diffused public, well-organized industry
groups have significant incentives to focus on the intricate details of
financial regulation. Because most rules will only have a slight impact
on individual members of the public, the public has little incentive to pay
attention to the regulatory process. In contrast, industry profits may rise
and fall significantly with financial regulation, and industry members
have strong incentives to seek rents.
particularly pervasive and difficult to avoid."); Tuch, supra note 20, at 158 ("Regulatory capture theory
may nevertheless help in understanding a self-regulator's enforcement weaknesses.").
213. Solomon, supra note 71 (explaining that ideological capture occurs when regulators "share the
same beliefs and ideas as their industry").
214. Melanie Waddell, 'Dissident' Candidate Viesfor FINRA Board Seat, THINKADVISOR (July 7,
2015), http://www.thinkadvisor.com/2015/07/07/dissident-candidate-vies-for-finra-board-seat (quoting
Brian Kovack) (In particular, he claimed that the industry-controlled arbitration forum needed better
methods to deal with "frivolous claims," that the examination process could be more efficient, and that
"exceptions" should be created to reduce the information brokers must disclose in their reports about
"unsatisfied judgments and liens or agreements with creditors.").
215. See Engstrom, Corralling Capture, supra note 206, at 32 ("[C]apture is a structural problem
that allows some interests to systematically win out over others.").
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3. Inactivity and Lax Enforcement
Self-regulatory organizations may fail to protect the public's interest
by failing to address known problems. While traditional regulatory
agencies may also be prone to inaction, self-regulatory bodies may be
particularly lethargic protectors in situations where actions in the public's
interest would undercut private profits. On these issues, government
action or public outcry may, on occasion, prod them into halting action.
Consider the long history of inaction on unpaid arbitration awards. In
2000, the Government Accountability Office reported that approximately
"61 percent . . . of investors who won arbitration awards in 1998 either
were not paid or received only partial payment." 2 16 A follow up report
indicated that in 2001, approximately "33 percent of... awards on claims
filed by investors were not fully paid." 2 17 Nonpayment has continued.
An analysis of 2013 awards showed that more than a third of investor
awards went unpaid in 2013.218
The issue over unpaid awards matters because it cuts to a core premise
behind self-regulation: self-regulation works well if the industry bears the
costs of its misbehavior. 21 9 Despite this, FINRA does not require its firms
to acquire insurance to bear the costs of their operations or to maintain
significant capital reserves.220 While FINRA does expel member firms
that fail to pay arbitration awards, the individuals employed by those
firms often simply relocate to another firm and continue with business as
usual. 2 2 1 The practice is so common that the term "cockroaching" was
coined to describe "brokers moving from one problem firm to another." 2 22
While reform advocates have suggested creating a national compensation
pool to address the issue, FINRA has not been particularly active on the
issue.223
Self-regulatory organizations have also been criticized for lax
oversight of their members' activities, allowing unethical and even illegal
216. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/GGD-00-115, SECURITIES ARBITRATION:
ACTIONS NEEDED TO ADDRESS PROBLEM OF UNPAID AWARDS 33 (2000).
217. U.S. Gov'T ACCOuNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-03-162R, FOLLOW-up REPORT ON MATTERS
RELATING TO SECuRITIEs ARBITRATION 3 (2003).
218. BERKSON, supra note 172, at 2.
219. See Birdthistle & Henderson, supra note 2, at 8-9.
220. Jean Eaglesham, Arbitration Awards Against Stockbrokers Go Unpaid, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 25,
2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/arbitration-awards-against-stockbrokers-go-unpaid-1456376403.
221. Jean Eaglesham & Rob Barry, More Than 5,000 Stockbrokers From Expelled Firms Still
Selling Securities, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 4, 2013),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303643304579107442831410708.
222. Id.
223. See BERKSON, supra note 172, at 37 ("FINRA, like the NASD before it, has remained quiet
regarding the issue of unpaid awards.").
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conduct to continue.22 4 This risk grows particularly acute when they
oversee members that actively participate in the self-regulatory
organization themselves. For example, Richard Whitney was not the only
self-regulatory organization head to steal from widows and orphans.
Bernard Madoff, a former NASD board member, ran the world's largest
Ponzi scheme under FINRA's watch. 225 He participated extensively in
the organization, holding committee assignments and serving on the
Board of Governors.22 6 His brother, Peter Madoff, served as the NASD's
vice chairman and his son and niece also served on NASD committees.22 7
Industry members may cultivate lax enforcement by publicly praising
a self-regulator's strength and vigor. Consider the following scenario:
when an industry member successfully conceals fraud, abusive sales
practices, record-keeping failures or other issues from examination staff,
it has no incentive to reveal the problem and incur liability. Instead, it
publicly complains about the rigor, invasiveness, and duration of the
examination. This accomplishes multiple objectives. First, it fosters an
impression that the particular firm must meet high standards because it
overcame such an ordeal. It also provides a basis to diminish the degree
of oversight in the future. Finally, and importantly, industry members-
from substandard operations to the most sterling shops-face the same
incentive to praise oversight's efficacy because it contributes to a positive
impression about their operation.
Madoff participated in this dynamic when he praised oversight in 2007,
claiming that "in today's regulatory environment, it's virtually impossible
to violate rules . . . and this is something that the public really doesn't
understand ... it's impossible for a violation to go undetected." 2 2 8
The SEC's investigation into its failure to discover Madoffs Ponzi
224. Cf Orenbach, supra note 56, at 153 ("In the realm of cases FINRA has actually brought, there
is some reason to suspect the quality of its performance.").
225. See Christine Hurt, Evil Has A New Name (and A New Narrative): Bernard Madoff, 2009
MICH. ST. L. REV. 947, 953 (2009) (describing the rise and fall of Madoff's record-shattering Ponzi
scheme).
226. Steven Irwin et al., Self-Regulation of the American Retail Securities Markets -An Oxymoron
for What Is Best for Investors?, 14 U. PA. J. Bus. L. 1055, 1075 (2012) (describing Madoff's connections
to the NASD).
227. Id.
228. Jessica Pressler, Bernie Madoff 'In Today's Regulatory Environment, It's Virtually Impossible
to Violate Rules,' N.Y. MAG. (Dec. 16, 2008),
http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2008/12/bernie_madofftinjtodays-regula_.html (noting that
while running what was to become the largest Ponzi scheme in financial history, Madoff served in
important positions within the securities industry's self-regulatory organization); see also Cheryl Nichols,
Addressing Inept SEC Enforcement Efforts: Lessons from Madoff the Hedge Fund Industry, and Title IV
of the Dodd-FrankActfor U.S. and Global Financial Systems, 31 Nw. J. INT'LL. & Bus. 637, 645 (2011)
("Madoff, along with his family, sought and obtained top-level positions in the securities industry and
with regulators. Madoff was a member of the [FINRA] board of governors.").
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scheme revealed the actual weakness of FINRA's oversight.229 Members
of the SEC's examination team stated that they generally found FINRA's
own examination reports to be "not very helpful." 230  One examiner
speculated that FINRA examinations "completely missed" issues either
because of "connections to the industry," incompetence, or a general
check-the-box mentality. 231
Of course, the SEC also deserves plenty of criticism for its failures to
discover Madoffs fraud.23 2 It had information warranting a much more
extensive investigation in 1992 but failed to connect the dots.233 It also
failed to uncover the fraud despite receiving detailed tips from Harry
Markopolos and conducting multiple subsequent examinations.234
4. Illusory Rulemaking Activity
Self-regulatory organizations may also be prone to engaging in illusory
activity-actions designed to give the appearance of effort but without
any real substance. For example, FINRA frequently and conspicuously
claims that its "first responsibility is to investors" and that it promotes
market confidence by "efficiently addressing emerging investor-
protection concerns."235 As evidence of its purportedly aggressive
protection of the public interest, FINRA's most recent annual report
prominently touts a proposed "rule to protect seniors from financial
exploitation."236
FTNRA's protection of seniors and vulnerable individuals may be more
illusory than real. If enacted, the celebrated rule proposal would not
actually impose any significant investor protection requirements on
FINRA's member firms. It would do two things: (i) require firms to
attempt to identify a contact person in case of the customer's incapacity;
and (ii) authorize firms to, at their sole discretion, put policies in place to
put temporary holds on accounts when "there is a reasonable belief of
financial exploitation" occurring.237 The proposed rule attracted
229. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS, INVESTIGATION OF FAILURE OF THE SEC
TO UNCOVER BERNARD MADOFF'S PONZI SCHEME 175-77 (2009) [hereinafter SEC INVESTIGATION].
230. Id. at 176.
23 1. Id.
232. See Mark Klock, Lessons Learned from Bernard Madoff Why We Should Partially Privatize
the Barney Fifes at the SEC, 42 ARIz. ST. L.J. 783, 788-804 (2010) (detailing the failures in the SEC's
oversight of Madoff).
233. Id. at 791-92.
234. Id. at 794.
235. FINRA, 2015 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 1-2.
236. Id. at 2.
237. FINRA, REGULATORY NOTICE 15-37: FINANCIAL EXPLOITATION OF SENIORS AND OTHER
VULNERABLE ADULTS I (Oct. 2015),
https://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/notice-doc-file-ref/Regulatory-Notice-15-37.pdf While
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comments from law school clinics with an interest in public welfare.
Georgia State explained that while it supported the effort, the proposed
rule gave the industry a safe harbor to keep assets within the firm without
imposing any obligation to actually do anything.23 8 The University of
Miami School of Law also asked for changes, proclaiming that the rule
"creates no obligation" to do anything.2 39
Financial self-regulatory organizations are not the only self-regulatory
bodies prone to illusory rulemaking activity. 2 4 0  The American Bar
Association's Model Rule 6.1, states that lawyers "should aspire to render
at least (50) hours of pro bono public legal services per year." 2 41  The
comment to the rule makes clear that the "responsibility . . . is not
intended to be enforced through disciplinary process."242
When it comes to attorneys, reputation may provide some pressure to
perform pro bono services. 24 3 The ABA Law Firm Pro Bono Challenge
asks large firms to contribute a certain percentage of billable hours to pro
bono service and publicizes successes and failures. 24 While imperfect,
the Challenge has been credited with an overall increase in the amount of
pro bono services law firms perform. 245 Importantly, pro bono services
yield benefits to law firms as well, including positive publicity, attorney
development, and the ability to recruit talented, public-minded law
students by making a credible promise that they will be able to participate
in pro bono opportunities. While Model Rule 6.1 imposes no obligation,
the "spotlight of public pressure" fills this gap by strongly encouraging
246pro bono service.
collecting emergency contact information will likely do much good, this small step hardly seems to
warrant the fanfare.
238. E-mail from Nicole lannarone, Assistant Clinical Professor, Chris Pugh, Jason Robinson &
Darius Wood, Student Interns, Georgia State University College of Law Investor Advocacy Clinic, to
Marcia E. Asquith, Corporate Secretary, FINRA (Nov. 25, 2015),
http://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/15-37-georgia-state-law comment.pdf ("[T]he Proposal also
allows a Qualified Person to use their discretion to ignore a reasonable belief that financial exploitation is
likely and do nothing.").
239. E-mail from Theresa J. Verges, Director, Investor Rights Clinic, University of Miami School
of Law, to Marcia E. Asquith, Corporate Secretary, FINRA (Nov. 30, 2015),
http://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/15-37_University-Miami-School-Law-comment.pdf (explaining
that the proposed rule "would allow a broker-dealer to ignore evidence of financial exploitation" without
reporting the suspected exploitation or putting a hold on the account).
240. See Richard W. Painter, Rules Lawyers Play By, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 665, 726 (2001) ("The
ABA and state bar associations have responded to shortages in legal services with aspirational rules.").
241. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 6.1 (AM. BAR Ass'N 1983).
242. See id. cmt. 12.
243. See Painter, supra note 240, at 727 (explaining that "[i]f information about compliance is
widely disseminated, the rule could become a reputationally-enforced rule").
244. See Scott L. Cummings, The Politics ofPro Bono, 52 UCLA L. REv. 1, 40 (2004).
245. Id.
246. Id. at 84.
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FINRA's aspirational, proposed senior protection seems to have seen
less success than the ABA's aspirational pro bono rule. The proposal
includes no mechanism to differentiate broker-dealer firms that commit
to senior-protection policies from those that do not. If anything, the
proposed rule's structure creates an incentive not to take additional steps
to protect seniors. Without some differentiating publicity, firms that take
steps to protect seniors may simply incur costs that will not be borne by
their competitors. Thus, firms that protect seniors may underperform
compared to firms that do not.
As discussed below, including reputational enforcement mechanisms
would increase competition without any substantial burden.2 47 FINRA's
BrokerCheck system already makes reports about firms and individual
brokers available. Prominently including this information in the reports
might provide an adequate reputational incentive.
V. AMPLIFY THE PUBLIC'S VOICE
Most observers agree that self-regulatory organizations often struggle
to protect the public's interest. 2 4 8 Despite such common knowledge,
crafting policy responses remains difficult. Jeff Gordon has explained
that administrative rulemaking's traditional benefit-cost analysis
approach fails to account for the unique nature of financial regulation.2 49
Consider the contrasting case of using pesticides to protect crops. In the
near term, evolution proceeds so slowly that, for a reasonably foreseeable
period, an administrative agency can calculate with a reasonable degree
of certainty the increase in crop yields and balance it against any negative
population health effects from using the pesticides. Pesticides do not
suddenly become nontoxic.
The man-made financial system responds differently to regulation than
a natural environmental system. It does not operate according to the laws
of nature, but rather the rules of the financial system.25 0 When the
financial system's rules change, industry members adapt rapidly and may
fundamentally restructure their transactions. 2 5 1 Adaptation and change
occur so rapidly that it may be impossible to predict the eventual benefits
and costs of a proposed financial regulation. 2 5 2
247. See text accompanying note 260.
248. See note 197.
249. Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Empty Call for Benefit-Cost Analysis in Financial Regulation, 43 J.
LEGAL STUDiEs 351, 375 (2014).
250. See id. at 352 ("For the financial sector, the system that generates costs and benefits is not a
natural system but rather a system constructed by the pattern of financial regulation itself and by the
subsequent processes of adaptation and regulatory arbitrage.").
25 1. Id.
252. Id. at 352-53.
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Given these challenges, the best regulatory approach may be to proceed
with core normative principles in mind.2 5 3  Because self-regulatory
organizations struggle to protect the public interest, effective structural
reforms will elevate the public interest within these organizations. 2 5 4
Insights into addressing the problem emerge by looking at it through
the lens of Albert 0. Hirschman's classic "exit, voice, and loyalty"
typology. 255 The seminal text describes the different ways consumers,
shareholders, or citizens express their displeasure at organizational
choices. Exit and voice provide the two primary mechanisms for
expressing displeasure. For example, putting judicial ethics to the side,
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg used her "voice" to express displeasure
when she characterized Donald Trump as a "faker," 256 and referenced the
"exit" option when she said that his election might call for a "move to
New Zealand." 2 5 7 While dissatisfied shareholders may sell their holdings
and "exit" if they dislike management decisions, the public lacks any
meaningful mechanism to "exit" financial regulation. Similarly, the
public's voice in the process is particularly muted within self-regulatory
organizations that are well-insulated from the political process.
Amplifying the public's voice may alter the behavior of self-regulatory
organizations. The general idea has been accepted for some time. Other
academics have called to include public representatives in self-regulatory
processes.2 58 The industry accepts this premise as well. In a rear-guard
action to ward off regulation, the NYSE first began to include hand-
selected, purportedly public members after the Great Depression. Still, a
greater focus on amplifying the public voice in the process may yield
253. See id. at 374 ("[Clritical judgments ought to not to be made on the basis of [benefit-cost
analysis] but rather in light of normative principles that the regulator is prepared to defend as undergirding
a sound financial system and that may be in competition with one another.").
254. Adam Levitin has recognized that changes to regulatory structure has previously been
embraced to improve regulatory performance. See Adam J. Levitin, The Politics ofFinancial Regulation
and the Regulation ofFinancial Politics: A Review Essay, 127 HARv. L. REv. 1991, 2054 (2014) ("Rather
than returning financial regulation to the ballot box, a second approach to the capture problem has been
to pursue targeted changes in the architecture of financial regulation to attempt to mitigate capture.");
accord Judge, supra note 21, at 640 ("[S]tructural reforms that reduce the magnitude of the advantages
that entrenched intermediaries typically enjoy may also reduce intermediary influence.").
255. See generally ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE
IN FIRMs, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 4, 77 (1970) (describing the roles of exit, voice, and loyalty on
the part of shareholders).
256. Editorial, Donald Trump Is Right About Justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg, N.Y. TIMES (July 13,
2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/13/opinion/donald-trump-is-right-about-justice-ruth-bader-
ginsburg.html?_r=0 (arguing that "Justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg needs to drop the political punditry and
the name-calling").
257. Id.
258. See Omarova, supra note 204, at 635 (calling for participation from public interest
representatives alongside regulators and industry). Ian Ayers and John Braithwate have argued that
empowered public interest groups may mitigate regulatory capture; see also generally IAN AYRES & JOHN
BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE (1992).
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significant additional benefits by providing a countervailing force to
balance against industry interests.
This approach, however, will not solve all problems. Self-regulatory
organizations will continue to fail to protect the public's interest in many
situations. Still, amplifying the public's voice may lead to swifter action
than would naturally stem from governance regimes without meaningful
public input.
A range of possible policy responses may amplify the public's voice in
the self-regulatory process. Substantial improvements may be gained by
addressing known weaknesses with the existing processes to
institutionalize the public's voice in self-regulatory organizations. While
incremental reforms will not eliminate all issues, they will advance core
normative principles. This section suggests reforms to amplify the
public's voice from the inside, outside, and above.
A. Inside: Public Appointment Processes
Consider the current use of public representatives. Self-regulatory
organizations have long claimed to include the public's voice inside their
governance process. In most instances, reforms giving the appearance of
public voice were implemented in response to past scandals and failures.
For example, the NYSE first added three purportedly public members to
its board after the Great Depression in an attempt to head off more
substantive reforms.2 5 9 The tradition continued with the NASD moving
to a majority public board after the odd-eighths scandal.26 0
Longstanding concern about the ability of industry to "capture" the
public representatives on self-regulatory boards appears justified. For
example, the Massachusetts Securities Division, one of the most vigilant
state securities divisions, argued in 2007 at FINRA's birth that the self-
regulator would be "fundamentally flawed if the representatives of
investors are chosen directly or indirectly by the securities industry or the
current" self-regulatory associations.261
At present, it appears that the securities industry indirectly selects the
investor representatives that serve on FINRA's board as Public
Governors. Public Governors are appointed by the FINRA "Board from
259. See supra notes 46, 47.
260. See SEC, 2 1A Report, supra note 142, at 4 ("The NASD reorganized to provide for a Board
of Governors which includes a majority of non-industry members.").
261. Comment Letter from William F. Galvin, Secretary of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts,
to Nancy M. Morris, Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission (Apr. 18, 2007),
https://www.sec.gov/comments/sr-nasd-2007-023/nasd2007023-73.pdf ("We specifically recommend
that bodies like the North American Securities Administrators Association, the American Association of
Retired Persons, and the Consumer Federation of America be among the investor advocates who select
the Public Governors. . . .").
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candidates recommended to the Board by the Nominating Committee."262
Under the bylaws, the "number of Public Governors on the Nominating
Committee shall equal or exceed the number of Industry Governors on
the Nominating Committee."2 63 While FINRA does not publish the
names of the Governors serving on the nominating committee, the bylaws
permit the industry to have an equal voice in selecting Public Governors.
Because of this structure, a single industry-aligned Public Governor on
the Nominating Committee may give industry representatives control
over the Public Governor nomination process.
Self-regulatory organizations could more credibly commit to
incorporating the public's voice in their governance by moving the
appointment process for public representatives outside of the
organization. The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
(PCAOB) provides an illustrative example of how to structure the
appointment process for a self-regulatory organization's leadership. 2 64
Congress created the PCAOB after a series of accounting scandals, and
granted the SEC authority to appoint the leadership of the PCAOB.2 65
While controversial, the Supreme Court upheld the appointment structure,
so long as the PCAOB's members were removable at will.266 While the
PCAOB has its critics, John Coffee has praised it for outshining other
self-regulatory organizations supervised by the SEC.2 67
Altering the appointment process for Public Governors to FINRA's
Board of Governors may generate different results and amplify the
public's voice within the organization. At the least, it would provide a
limited check by reducing the ease with which industry-elected members
of the Board of Governors may appoint tame public representatives. A
number of different institutions would likely generate better appointment
results than the status quo. Public representatives could be appointed by
a cross-section of existing federal agencies and investor protection
262. FINRA, BY-LAWS OF THE CORPORATION ART. VII, § 5.
263. FINRA, BY-LAWS OF THE CORPORATION ART. VII, § 9(b).
264. See 15 U.S.C. § 7211 (2012) (creating the PCAOB).
265. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 484 (2010) ("The
Board is composed of five members, appointed to staggered 5-year terms by the Securities and Exchange
Commission.").
266. Id. at 510. Notably, the Supreme Court struck down the portion of Sarbanes-Oxley insulating
the PCAOB's members from removal. For a discussion on this point, see Dina Mishra, An Executive-
Power Non-Delegation Doctrine for the Private Administration ofFederal Law, 68 VAND. L. REv. 1509,
1569 (2015) ("PCAOB therefore extended a removability-at-will requirement to the PCAOB members, a
set of inferior executive officers who were removable only by for-cause-protected principal officers.").
267. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Backstabbing in Washington: The Curious Case of the PCAOB,
COLUMBIA BLUE SKY BLOG (Sept. 21, 2015),
http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2015/09/2 1/backstabbing-in-washington-the-curious-case-of-the-
pcaob/#_edn2 ("[A]mong the SEC and its network of subordinate SROs, only the PCAOB has come up
with a coherent strategy for stressing individual accountability (namely, disclosing the identity of the
engagement partner).").
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nonprofits. For example, superior public representatives might emerge if
appointed by a mix of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB),
SEC, the North American Securities Administrators Association,
Department of Justice, Department of Labor, and Department of Veterans
Affairs. All of these institutions, agencies, and organizations have a
strong interest in investor protection and retirement security.
Dispersed appointment responsibilities also may do some good.
Dispersing the appointment power for public representatives would
increase the likelihood that a self-regulatory organization's board will
incorporate a variety of views. 268 It may also make it more difficult for
an industry to effectively control the appointment process; instead of
needing to gain control of one public representative on the Nominating
Committee, coordinated industry interests seeking to capture the slate
would need far broader influence. Furthermore, attempts to gain this
influence might be mitigated by other groups battling for the attention of
federal agencies. For example, the financial services industry might find
labor activists also vying to influence the Department of Labor.
B. Outside: Increased Transparency
While changes to the appointment process would amplify the public's
voice from within self-regulatory organizations, increased transparency
would improve outside monitoring of self-regulatory organizations. For
example, outside actors often struggle to bring pressure to bear on self-
regulatory organizations because they cannot obtain information.269
Transparency can be increased through modest reforms.
1. Public Reporting
Public reporting offers significant benefits. Transparency could be
significantly increased by requiring FINRA and other self-regulatory
organizations to make public disclosures similar to those made by public
companies. The Exchange Act requires publicly traded companies to file
annual reports that disclose significant amounts of information. These
disclosures then appear on the SEC's website in a standardized format
that allows for easy access to relevant information.2 70 At present, FINRA
does not operate in the same disclosure structure, making it difficult for
268. Cf Solomon, supra note 71 ("What perhaps would work, though, would be to foster a diversity
of backgrounds and views among regulators.").
269. See Fisch, supra note 167, at 800 ("[F]ew of the details of FINRA's investigations, its
disciplinary actions, and even its customer arbitrations are transparent.").
270. See EDGAR: Company Filings, SEC
https://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/companysearch.html (last visited July 16, 2016).
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the public to gain insight into its operations or about the backgrounds of
the public representatives serving on its board. Public companies publish
information about company directors including, among other things,
information about their business experience and any other relatively
recent directorships they have held.27 ' When a public company director
departs under unusual circumstances, the SEC's rules often require
companies to provide the public with information indicating the reasons
for the departure.27 2 FINRA does not operate under similar reporting
requirements and need not release any information when a public
governor departs its board.
Posting information to the SEC's website would also limit FINRA's
ability to edit reports after issuance. Consider the issues that emerged
after a draft version of this Article appeared on the Social Science
Research Network. One version of FINRA's 2015 Annual Report listed
Robert W. Scully as a public governor as of June 15, 2016.273 After
realizing that it had not disclosed accurate information about the
composition of its board as of that date, FINRA simply modified the
previously released annual report to omit Mr. Scully's name.274  A
requirement that FINRA and other self-regulatory organizations disclose
information through the SEC's disclosure portal would alert the public
about material changes because alterations would be accomplished
through the filing of an amended annual report instead of simply
modifying the contents of a previously issued report.
2. Limited Access to Information About SEC Oversight
One recent case illustrates the difficulty outside groups experience
when seeking information about processes at self-regulatory
organizations. The Public Investors Arbitration Bar Association
(PIABA), a nationwide bar association of investor advocates, sought
information from the SEC about its oversight of FINRA's arbitration
275process.27 Because FINRA is not subject to the Freedom of Information
271. 17 C.F.R. § 229.401(e) (Lexis, Lexis Advance through the Mar. 29, 2017 issue of the Federal
Register) ("Briefly describe the business experience during the past five years of each director . . . .").
272. See SEC, Instructions to Form 8-K, Item 5.02(a)(iii) (requiring public companies to provide
"a brief description of the circumstances representing the disagreement that the registrant believes caused,
in whole or in part, the director's resignation, refusal to stand for re-election or removal").
273. See Benjamin P. Edwards, Selecting the Public's Representatives in the Financial Regulatory
Process, PRAWFSBLAWG (Aug. 26, 2016),
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2016/08/selecting-the-publics-representatives-in-the-
financial-regulatory-process.html.
274. Id.
275. See Pub. Invest. Arb. Bar Ass'n v. U.S. SEC, 930 F. Supp. 2d 55 (2013), aff'd 771 F.3d I
(2014) [hereinafter PIABA I].
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Act (FOIA) as it is not a government entity, PIABA sought "records
related to the SEC's oversight" of FINRA.2 7 6 The SEC identified 65
boxes of potentially responsive materials in response to the request but
declined to produce any of them under a FOIA exemption.27 7
Government agencies do not always provide all information sought in
FOIA requests. There are nine different exemptions that allow federal
agencies to refuse to disclose documents in response to FOIA requests.27 8
The SEC identified Exemption 8, which provides that federal agencies
need not produce information "related to examination, operating, or
condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency
responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions." 27 9
At the present, FINRA qualifies as a financial institution under an odd
Exchange Act definition that Congress tweaked in an attempt to protect
the records of financial institutions while preventing the SEC from
covering up its Madoff-related oversight failures. 2 80 This means that the
SEC does not need to disclose information to the public about its
oversight of FINRA or any other self-regulatory organization. 2 8 1
In most instances, Exemption 8 serves a useful purpose. The
exemption allows financial institutions to communicate with their
regulators without fearing that "their confidential information will be
disclosed." 2 8 2 Absent this sort of protection, financial institutions might
resist basic information requests for fear that answering a regulator's
questions would mean the publication of internal business affairs.
The traditional rationale applies with much less force to the SEC's
hesitation in sharing its oversight practices of industry self-regulatory
organizations. Remarking on the oddity, the district court explained that
it was "skeptical that a self-regulatory organization like FINRA would
logically qualify as a 'financial institution' as that term has traditionally
been defined or. . . understood." 2 8 3 Despite this oddity, the court found
that while the "plaintiff may be correct that Exemption 8 is overbroad
because it extends to records related to the oversight of self-regulatory
organizations, . . . there is no escaping the conclusion that Congress has
left no room for a narrower interpretation. "284 Given the statute's text, the
court explained that PIABA would need to direct its arguments "at
276. Id. at 58.
277. Id. at 60.
278. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2012).
279. Id. § 522(b)(8).
280. See PIABA I, 930 F. Supp. 2d at 67-70.
281. Id.
282. Bloomberg, L.P. v. U.S. SEC, 357 F. Supp. 2d 156, 170 (D.D.C. 2004).
283. PIABA I, 930 F. Supp. 2d at 69.
284. Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted).
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Congress, rather than the courts," even though the amendments had
resulted in "unintended consequences." 285
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit affirmed, also concluding that Exemption
8 swept broadly and effectively exempted examination and oversight
information related to any entity the SEC regulates, including self-
regulatory organizations.2 86 Despite agreeing with this reading of the
statute, Judge Brown crafted a striking concurrence and called for
Congress to "revisit this ill-conceived amendment" that defined financial
institutions as anything under the SEC's oversight.287
3. Increase Access to Information
Either Congressional action or SEC rulemaking could amplify the
public's voice by providing more access to information. Transparency
also provides significant benefits. It would subject self-regulatory
organizations to more constant public scrutiny, increasing the likelihood
that they will act in the public's interest. 288
Congress could also create additional transparency by revisiting
FOIA's exemptions. A more tailored structure could protect the sensitive
financial information of true financial institutions while allowing for the
public to review information about the SEC's oversight of self-regulatory
organizations. For example, information about the SEC's oversight of
FINRA's process for appointing Public Governors would likely have
informed the preceding analysis.
Of course, not all transparency initiatives must come from Congress.
The SEC could require FINRA to make more information more readily
available to the public, news organizations, and academics. At present,
FINRA often limits access to information of public concern. For
example, the Wall Street Journal aggregated information to identify
geographic locations with clusters of problem brokers. 2 89  Because
FINRA refuses to provide access to broker data in bulk, the Journal
painstakingly "filed public-records requests with all 50 state securities
285. Id. at 69-70.
286. See Pub. Invest. Arb. Bar Ass'n v. U.S. SEC, 771 F.3d 1, 7 (2014) (explaining that "documents
the Commission collects while examining financial institutions-that is, while examining any
organization the agency regulates-are exempt from disclosure") [hereinafter PIABA II].
287. Id. at 10 (Brown, J., concurring) (further providing that "[i]t bodes ill for rebuilding civic trust
that Exemption 8 could be employed to permanently shroud both the possible reckless conduct by
regulated financial institutions and the particulars of sweeping agency intrusions into the sphere of the
financial marketplace").
288. See Reiss, supra note 175, at 608 ("A less-noticed agency may feel more comfortable allowing
industry to deviate from the public interest than one that is under scrutiny.").
289. Jean Eaglesham & Rob Barry, How Troubled Brokers Cluster, Often Among Elderly Investors,
WALL ST. J. (Nov. 12, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/how-troubled-brokers-cluster-often-among-
elderly-investors-1415763019.
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regulators" to gain access to information held within a single FINRA-
maintained database.29 0
Researchers have also complained about FINRA's refusal to allow
access to data. The authors of one study characterized as misleading
FINRA's claims of allowing access to information about 1.2 million
stockbrokers. 2 9 1 While FINRA does allow investors to view a limited
subset of information on file about particular stockbrokers, it "actually
goes to great lengths to make information which is ostensibly public,
effectively non-public" by making it difficult to aggregate data.292
While the discussion has focused on FINRA, the need for additional
transparency extends to other self-regulatory organizations. Similar
problems also plague the derivatives market oversight by the
Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC).29 3
C. Above: Enhanced SEC Oversight
The public's voice might also be amplified by enhanced oversight from
the SEC. While the SEC faces significant resource constraints, some
action lies within its power to address the problems detailed here. For
example, the SEC might do much good by using its oversight role to
intervene when self-regulatory bodies engage in illusory activity.
Reputational enforcement mechanisms could create an incentive for
firms to comply with aspirational standards and rules. At present,
FINRA's proposed senior and vulnerable-adult rules do not actually
require any industry firms to do anything to protect anyone when they
294become aware of financial exploitation. These proposals would be
substantially improved if they also created some sort of reputational
enforcement mechanism, such as a scorecard or additional disclosures on
the BrokerCheck Reports of the registered representatives affiliated with
FINRA member firms.
Consider the competitive benefits if FINRA and its member firms were
required to publicize whether they actually create and agree to be bound
by policies designed to protect senior citizens. A BrokerCheck Report
290. Id.
291. See McCann et al., supra note 121, at 4-5.
292. Id. at 3. (calling for FINRA to "make BrokerCheck information truly publicly available and
allow rating companies ... and news outlets ... to rank brokerage firms on the risk of fraud"); see also
generally Randall K. Johnson, Why We Need A Comprehensive Recording Fraud Registry, 2014 N.Y.U.
J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y QUORUM 88 (2014) (finding that U.S. government agencies that provide greater
access to public information may deter more misconduct than other agencies).
293. See Derek Fischer, Dodd-Frank's Failure to Address CFTC Oversight of Self-Regulatory
Organization Rulemaking, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 69, 108 (2015) (arguing that CFTC oversight of SROs
could be improved by disclosure requirements).
294. See text accompanying notes 235 to 246.
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indicating that a particular associated person worked for a firm that opted
out of providing senior citizen protections could provide a valuable data
point for a customer. To the extent that these reforms actually protect
seniors and vulnerable adults, the public would likely benefit from being
able to differentiate the firms that implement these policies from those
that do not. If senior-protecting firms advertised their policies or received
public recognition for the move, it would provide a competitive
advantage, justifying the outlay of resources. At present, FINRA's
proposed rule does not create that incentive.
VI. IMPLICATIONS AND ALTERNATIVES
As discussed above, calculating the future impact of financial
regulation may be impossible because the financial system changes much
more rapidly and dramatically than any natural system. 295  Still
alternatives and implications must be considered. This Part briefly
responds to potential objections.
A. Diminished Expertise?
Appointing public representatives without significant industry
connections may come at some cost. Without some connection to the
industry, FINRA's Public Governors may lack the expertise to function
effectively in their role. The roster of qualified candidates might shrink
dramatically if FINRA were to limit itself to persons that had never served
within the industry.
Finding qualified candidates with less apparent conflicts may require
some work. Still, it seems likely that sufficiently qualified candidates
without the sorts of conflicts and relationships detailed above may be
found. For example, the North American Securities Administrators
Association might be able to suggest current former or state securities
regulators with sufficient expertise and without deep, entangling industry
connections. It should also be possible to draw from former industry
members without needing to resort to candidates that concurrently serve
on the boards of financial institutions. Similarly, investor advocates with
a history of successfully challenging the industry for abusive sales
practices might make strong candidates for an organization devoted to
investor protection.
In any event, offloading the Public Governor appointment process to
other institutions would reduce that possibility that current industry
members would use existing processes to ensure the appointment of pliant
295. See Gordon, supra note 249.
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public representatives.
B. Abolish FINRA?
The voice-amplifying proposals advanced above might also be
criticized for their modest approach. Given the long history of scandals
and failures detailed above, it may seem better to simply start anew and
create an entirely new, entirely public regulatory apparatus.
While this proposal has some merit, it seems both unlikely and unwise.
From a public-cost perspective, it seems unlikely that the current
Congress will create sustained funding for the SEC sufficient to enable it
to entirely absorb FI4RA's regulatory responsibilities. Without public
willingness to fund regulation and oversight, an entirely public model
might perform even worse than the current self-regulatory model.
Radical reforms also create risk. While this Article takes a generally
critical view, the self-regulatory model has generated a well-functioning,
albeit costly, securities market. Given the capital market's central
importance to the world economy, gradual tinkering is likely superior to
sudden reforms. Any potentially destabilizing regulatory intervention
might provide a cure worse than the disease.
VII. CONCLUSION
This Article proposes amplifying the public's voice in the self-
regulatory process through a variety of mechanisms, including
governance, transparency, and enhanced governmental oversight. While
these incremental reforms seem likely to dramatically alter institutional
behavior, their adoption and implementation must be guided by a focus
on long-term public's interest in financial regulation.
Structures that amplify the public's voice in pursuit of the public
interest would do much to limit the dark side of self-regulation. For better
or worse, the self-regulatory system seems entrenched into the fabric of
the modern financial markets. Disbanding self-regulatory organizations
might do significant short-term harm. It also appears unlikely that
Congress would credibly commit to sustained public funding for
oversight of the financial markets. Given FINRA's important position,
governance reforms aimed at increasing its public mindedness and
sympathy to public concerns may offer the best option for altering its
behavior. Ultimately, FINRA wields power and authority entrusted to it
by Congress and the public. It should remain responsive to public
concerns.
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